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Abstract
Three studies explored the possibility that the structure of the self-concept is associated 
with 6agile self-esteem. The model of self-concept structure examined in the present 
studies is evaluative organization, especially the distinction between 
compartmentalization and integration. Compartmentalization is the tendency to segregate 
positively and negatively valenced self-beliefs into separate self-aspects, whereas 
integration is the tendency for attributes of opposite valence to appear in the same self­
aspects. Study 1 showed that compartmentalization was associated with state self-esteem 
that was less stable over time and that appeared to be more reactive to daily events and 
stress. Study 2 found that the state self-esteem of compartmentalized individuals 
appeared to be primarily reactive to social events and that the self-esteem of these 
individuals was contingent upon meeting certain standards (e.g., approval of others and 
physical appearance). Study 3 employed a laboratory manipulation of social rejection to 
confirm that the state self-esteem of compartmentalized individuals was highly reactive 
to social rejection. Findings across the three studies suggest that individuals with 
compartmentalized self-concept structures may be best characterized as possessing 
hagile self-esteem, whereas individuals with integrative self-concepts appear to possess 
self-esteem that is relatively secure. These results suggest that some of the benefits 
believed to be associated with compartmentalization (e.g., high self-esteem) may actually 
reflect defensive processes rather than true psychological adjustment.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine two individuals, both of whom recently lost their positions as middle- 
level managers at a technology 6rm due to corporate downsizing. Although the 
circumstances of these individuals may have been very similar, it is easy to imagine that 
their reactions to this event may have differed considerably. For example, the first 
individual may have immediately begun seeking employment elsewhere and continued to 
think of himself in relatively positive terms despite his disappointment and growing 
financial concerns. Understandably, the loss of his job would have increased his level of 
stress; however, it may have had little effect on his feelings of self-worth. On his best 
days, he may have even been able to see his current unemployment as an opportunity for 
growth. In contrast, the second individual may have been convinced by her sudden 
unemployment that she had been incompetent as a manager and that she would never be 
able to succeed in the world of business. As a result of her conviction that she was a 
failure, it is very possible that she became despondent about her current life 
circumstances and her self-esteem plummeted. Further, the second individual's strong 
negative emotional reactions and loss of self-esteem may have impaired her ability to 
function in her day-to-day life, preventing her 6om finding satisfactory employment and 
thus exacerbating her negative mood and low self-esteem.
This example illustrates that even though most individuals are emotionally 
responsive to the events in their lives, individuals diSer widely in the intensity, duration, 
and variability of these responses (e.g., Diener, Larsen, Levine, & Emmons, 1985; 
Larsen, 1987; Larsen & Diener, 1987; Larsen, Diener, & Emmons, 1986; Lazarus &
Folkman, 1984). Emotional responses may be evoked by events ranging 6om relatively
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minor hassles (e.g., arguing with a spouse, gaining weight, or receiving a negative 
evaluation at work) to those events that have a far more substantial impact on an 
individual's life (e.g., divorce, traumatic injury, or loss of employment). Even relatively 
minor stressors have been shown to have consequences for affect (e.g., Bolger,
DeLongis, Kessler, & Schilling, 1989; Clark & Watson, 1988; DeLongis, Folkman, & 
Lazarus, 1988; Watson, 1988) and to have serious long-term mental health consequences 
(e.g., depression, career burnout, or divorce) if the stressors are of a chronic nature 
(Brown & Harris, 1978; Markman & Hahlweg, 1993; McGonagle & Kessler, 1990). 
Because individuals differ in their emotional reactions to self-relevant events, it is 
important to understand why these differences occur and what implications these 
differences may have for psychological a(^ustment.
Self-relevant events often have consequences for global affect and feelings of 
self-worth. A variety of possible contributors to affective reactivity have been proposed 
in the literature. For example, personality dimensions have often been linked to affective 
reactions with the strongest associations being found for neuroticism and extraversion 
(Costa & McCrae, 1980; Rusting & Larsen, 1995; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). A second 
factor that has been linked to affective reactivity is how individuals appraise and cope 
with stressfiil daily events. Both the choice of coping strategy and the effectiveness of the 
chosen coping strategy for the individual may influence responses to stress (Bolger & 
Zuckerman, 1995). Because coping is concerned with the management of psychological 
stress through changes in cognition and behavior (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), studies 
examining daily experiences hold a great deal of promise for coping research. A growing
number of studies have made use of the daily process approach and have supported the
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idea that appraisal and coping moderate reactions to daily events (David & Suis, 1999; 
Fontana & Palfai, 1994; Keefe, Affleck, Lefebvre, Starr, Caldwell, & Tennen, 1997; 
Marco, Neale, Schwartz, Shiffman, & Stone, 1999; Stone, Neale, & Shiffrnan, 1993; 
Tennen, Affleck, Armeli, & Carney, 2000).
In contrast to explanations of affective reactivity, which have been based 
primarily on personality or coping models, explanations for differences in self-esteem 
reactivity have focused almost exclusively on the self-concept (e.g., Butler, Hokanson, & 
Flynn, 1994; Nezlek & Gable, 2001). These explanations often draw upon previous ideas 
concerning conditions of self-worth (Rogers, 1959,1961). Rogers explained that 
individual differences in well-being may be partly due to the degree an individual's self- 
worth is based on environmental events or conditions. Environmental feedback (e.g., 
positive or negative daily events) would be especially important in determining the state 
self-esteem of individuals with contingent self-esteem (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). Rogers 
believed the self concept may influence the degree to which an individual's feelings of 
self worth are contingent upon external validation or reactive to events with potential 
implications for the self.
FRAGILE SELF-ESTEEM 
Although a considerable amount of research concerning self-esteem has been 
conducted in the past thirty years, much of this research has merely praised the virtues of 
high self-esteem. Despite the accumulation of a vast number of studies documenting the 
many differences that exist between individuals with high and low self-esteem (see 
Baumeister, 1993; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991), the costs and benefits
associated with high self-esteem remain unclear due to contrasting views of what it
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actually means to have high self-esteem. One of the popular views of individuals with 
high self-esteem is that they are satisfied with themselves, feel worthy, have confidence 
in their skills and abilities, yet are accepting of their weaknesses (Rogers, 1959,1961). 
According to this perspective, individuals with high self-esteem have a solid foundation 
for their feelings of self-worth that does not require constant validation. The fact that 
their feelings of self-worth are well-anchored is able to protect their self-esteem &om the 
normal adversities of daily life. The competing view of high self-esteem is that some 
individuals make hequent use of strategies to maintain or enhance their seemingly 
precious self-esteem resources. A considerable amount of empirical support also exists 
for this perspective. For example, individuals with high self-esteem are more likely to use 
self-serving attributions (Fitch, 1970), set inappropriately high goals following an ego- 
threat (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993), self-handicap in order to accentuate their 
accomplishments (Tice, 1991), actively create less fortunate others so that they can use 
downward comparisons (Gibbons & McCoy, 1991), and attack outgroup members 
following a criticism of their ingroup (Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987). 
In order to better understand this apparent contradiction, contemporary theorists (e.g., 
Deci & Ryan, 1995; Kemis, 2003) propose that there are actually two forms of high self­
esteem: secure and hagile. Individuals with secure high self-esteem match the former 
conceptualization of high self-esteem because their positive attitudes toward the self are 
realistic, well-anchored, and resistant to threat. Individuals with fragile high self-esteem 
are viewed as being consistent with the latter conceptualization in that their feelings of 
self-worth are vulnerable to challenge, need constant validation, and frequently require 
some degree of self-deception.
Currently, there are at least four ways to distinguish between secure and fragile 
high self-esteem: defensive self-esteem (Homey, 1950; Schneider & Turkat, 1975), 
contingent self-esteem (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Deci & Ryan, 1995), discrepant implicit 
and explicit self-esteem (Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003; Brown &
Bosson, 2001; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003), and unstable 
self-esteem (Kemis, Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993; Kemis, Grannemann, & 
Barclay, 1989; Kemis, Grannemann, & Mathis, 1991; see Kemis & Paradise, 2002 for a 
review of &agile high self-esteem). Of these current conceptualizations of &agile self­
esteem, self-esteem instability has received the most empirical attention so far and will 
also be the primary focus of the present investigation.
Although the vast m^ority of research has focused on the level of self-esteem 
(i.e., relatively enduring favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward the self), it has not 
gone unrecognized that self-esteem changes over time (Rosenberg, 1986). Unfortunately, 
this variability in self-esteem has often been perceived to be little more than error in the 
instruments used to measure self-esteem. However, self-esteem, like other psychological 
constructs (e.g., anxiety; see Spielberger, 1983), can be conceptualized as both a state 
that is highly dynamic and as a trait that is predominantly static (Heatherton & Polivy, 
1991). Self-esteem instability can be conceptualized in terms of either its baseline (long­
term changes) or barometric properties (short-term fluctuations; Rosenberg, 1986). 
Rosenberg (1986) suggests that long-term changes in self-esteem may result 6om the 
gradual accumulation of successes or failures in any relevant area of one's life (e.g., 
academics, career, physical appearance, or romantic relationships). Short-term, or
barometric, fluctuations in self-esteem are often conceptualized as the magnitude of
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change in state self-esteem over a relatively short period of time (Kemis, Grannemann, & 
Barclay, 1989; Rosenberg, 1986). These fluctuations in self-esteem may be in response to 
particular evaluative events that are either externally provided (e.g., receiving a poor test 
grade) or internally generated (e.g., thinking about one's weaknesses; Kemis, Paradise, 
Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000). Kemis and his colleagues (e.g., Kemis, 2003; 
Kemis & Waschull,1995; Paradise & Kemis, 2002) view the tendency to experience 
fluctuations in one's self-esteem as a dispositional characteristic that interacts with the 
immediate environment to produce a specific pattem of fluctuations. However, self­
esteem instability does not directly account for the covariation between state self-esteem 
and environmental events (i.e., self-esteem lability). In the present research, self-esteem 
lability is assumed to be a specific instance of self-esteem instability (cf. Bamett & 
Gotlib, 1988; Butler, Hokanson, & Flynn, 1994). In contrast to self-esteem instability, 
self-esteem lability directly links changes in state self-esteem to events that occur in the 
individual's life (e.g., receiving a low grade on an important exam) or relevant internal 
states (e.g., feeling overwhelmed by current responsibilities). In essence, self-esteem 
lability is the covariation between state selfesteem and daily events (Butler, Hokanson,
& Flynn, 1994); whereas self-esteem instability incorporates changes in self-esteem in 
response to daily events as well as fluctuations in selfesteem due to other factors (e.g., 
cognitive or biological processes). Thus, even though selfesteem instability and self 
esteem lability are closely linked, there are important features that distinguish them 6om 
each other.
Previous research concerning self-esteem instability has focused both on potential
factors that may lead to unstable selfesteem as well as possible consequences of unstable
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self-esteem. For example, one of the possible contributing factors to self-esteem 
instability is ego-involvement, which can be defined as the degree to which an 
individnal's self-esteem depends upon events that occur in one's life (Rosenberg, 1986). 
Initial research supports the assertion that individuals with unstable self-esteem also have 
a heightened degree of ego-involvement in their day-to-day activities (Kemis, Brown, & 
Brody, 2000; Kemis, Comell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993; Waschull & Kemis, 1996). 
This over-investment appears to result in individuals with unstable self-esteem having 
very strong reactions to events with potential relevance for their self-esteem. For 
example, individuals with unstable self-esteem feel worse in response to negative events 
and feel better following positive events than individuals with stable self-esteem (Kemis, 
Greenier, Herlocker, Whisenhunt, & Abend, 1997). Because individuals with unstable 
self-esteem are so invested in day-to-day activities, these individuals frequently perceive 
events as relevant to their self-esteem even when they are not (Kemis, Comell, Sun, 
Berry, & Harlow, 1993). Essentially, the self-regard of individuals with unstable self  ^
esteem is constantly at risk.
Individuals with high unstable self-esteem have been found to engage in more 
self-protective and self-enhancing strategies than other individuals (Kemis, 1993). For 
example, Kemis, Comell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow (1993) found that individuals with high 
unstable self-esteem were more likely to accept positive feedback and reject negative 
feedback. Another method for protecting or enhancing the self that may be particularly 
attractive to individuals with unstable self-esteem is self-handicapping (Tice, 1991). Self- 
handicapping occurs when an individual manipulates either the situation or one's own
behavior so as to seemingly lower the probability of success in some endeavor (Berglas
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& Jones, 1978; Jones & Berglas, 1978). Newman and Wadas (1997) fbnnd that 
individuals with unstable self-esteem were more likely to engage in self-handicapping. 
Similar results have shown that individuals with unstable self-esteem are more likely to 
make excuses for their performance (Kemis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1992).
Unstable self-esteem has also been found to be associated with poor 
psychological adjustment. For example, Kemis, Grannemaim, and Barclay (1989) found 
that individuals with high unstable self-esteem experienced the highest levels of anger 
whereas individuals with high stable self-esteem reported the lowest levels of anger. The 
anger experienced by individuals with high unstable self-esteem is believed to be the 
result of their positive, but fragile, attitudes toward the self. Although individuals with 
high unstable self-esteem may appear conGdent, they may actually be insecure and 
highly sensitive to evaluative feedback. It appears that these are the individuals with the 
most to lose from an event that threatens their self-esteem and, as a consequence, these 
individuals may protect against these threats to their self-esteem by becoming angry. 
Conversely, the low levels of anger reported by individuals with high stable self-esteem 
may be explained by their more realistic self-views which are not as easily threatened by 
evaluative feedback. Similarly, Kemis, Grannemann, and Mathis (1991) found that low 
stable self-esteem was strongly associated with dysphoric symptoms (cf. Butler, 
Hokanson, & Flynn, 1994; Roberts, Kassel, & Gotlib, 1995; Roberts & Monroe, 1992). 
These results may be due to the fact that although low self-esteem is a vulnerabihty 
factor for dysphoric mood, this vulnerability will be more pronounced among individuals 
with chronically low levels of self-esteem.
ORGANIZATION OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE
Although theorists as early as James (1890) and Mead (1934) recognized the 
importance of multiple selves to the understanding of the self-concept, most research has 
treated the self-concept as a single, monolithic entity. Despite the views of James and 
Mead which hinted at the importance of self-knowledge organization, it was not until the 
influence of cognitive psychology spread to the study of the self-concept that researchers 
began to shift from a unitary view of the self toward a multifaceted self-concept (e.g., 
Pratkanis & Greenwald, 1985; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Linville, 1987; Markus & 
Wurf, 1987). This new way of conceptualizing the self-concept allowed for distinctions 
to be drawn between self-concept content and self-concept structure. The content of the 
self-concept consists of a range of attributes or belief pertaining to the self that can be 
divided into knowledge components (e.g., traits) and evaluative components (e.g., 
valence of specific attributes; Campbell et al., 1996). Structural features of the self- 
concept refer to how the content of the self-concept is organized. An individual's beliefs 
about the self are thought to be organized into a set of f  such that each self­
aspect is defined by situations (Pelham & Swann, 1989), roles (Simon, 1999), other 
individuals (James, 1890), or traits and mood states (Pietromonaco, 1985). This 
multifaceted view of the self allows for the differentiation of various self-aspects so that 
individuals are able to construct selves that are appropriate for a variety of contexts 
(Cantor, Markus, Niedenthal, & Nurius, 1986; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Mischel, 1973; 
Schlenker & Weigold, 1989). The multifaceted self-concept also allows for differences in 
the elaboration, positivity, and importance of self-aspects. Individual differences in the 
manner in which information about the self is organized and stored in memory is
believed to influence the individuaTs characteristic level of self-esteem and mood
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(Showers, 1995).
A number of theoretical perspectives concerning structural features of the self- 
concept have emerged in the past two decades. These structural models include self­
complexity (Linville, 1985,1987), self-concept clarity (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 
1990), self-concept differentiation (Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993), self­
discrepancies (Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986), differential 
importance (Pelham, 1991; Pelham & Swann, 1989), and evaluative organization 
(Showers, 1992a, 2000; see Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2003 for a review of these structural 
models). Despite the important differences between these structural models, a common 
feature that may be relevant to temporal fluctuations in selfesteem and affect is shared 
by each of these models. Namely, each model suggests that the impact of any speciGc 
self belief on the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of the individual is determined by the 
location of that particular selfbelief in the larger self concept structure. One possible 
implication of this feature is that individuals with more complex self-concept structures -  
with "complexity" being characterized by a large number of elements that are 
hierarchically integrated (Crockett, 1965) -  may be less affected by their present 
circumstances resulting in feelings of self worth and affective states that are less 
dependent on environmental feedback than those possessed by individuals with less 
complex self-concept structures.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH CONCERNING ORGANIZATION
OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND REACTIVITY
In general, previous research has supported the contention that less complex self
concept structures may be associated with stronger emotional reactions to life events. An
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example of this can be seen in research concerning self-complexity. Self-complexity 
refers to the number and interrelatedness of an individuars self-aspects such that 
individuals with many highly differentiated self-aspects are said to be high in self­
complexity (Linville, 1985,1987). Linville's model assumes that the mood of individuals 
high in self-complexity would be less affected by current circumstances because the 
differentiated self-concept would prevent the proliferation of affective reactions. As 
support for Linville's model, individuals high in self-complexity have been found to 
exhibit more moderate affective responses following evaluative events (Cohen, Pane, & 
Smith, 1997; Linville, 1985), less variability in their daily moods (Linville, 1982, 1985), 
as well as less stress-related illness and psychological distress (Linville, 1987; Smith & 
Cohen, 1993; Steinberg, Pineles, Gardner, & Mineka, 2003). However, it should be noted 
that other studies have provided only partial support for Linville's model or have failed 
to support it altogether (e.g., Campbell, Chew, & Scratchley, 1991; Rhodewalt, Madrian, 
& Cheney, 1998; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998; Solomon & Haaga, 2003; see Rafaeli-Mor & 
Steinberg, 2002 for a review). Similarly, research concerning self-concept clarity -  the 
extent to which an individual's self-concept is clearly defined, internally consistent, and 
remains stable over time (Campbell, 1990; Campbell et al., 1996) -  has shown that 
individuals who are low in selfconcept clarity have a tendency to experience greater 
fluctuations in both self-esteem (Dori, 2002; Kemis, Paradise, et al., 2000) and affect 
(Campbell, Chew, & Scratchley, 1991; Chang, 2001; Dori, 2002; Stucke & Sporer,
2002). Thus, previous research concerning self-complexity and self-concept clarity has 
supported the contention that the structure of the self-concept may be associated with
variability in emotional experiences. The present study will extend these previous
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Gildings concerning self-concept structure by examining evaluative organization.
EVALUATIVE ORGANIZATION OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
Evaluative organization focuses on the distribution of positive and negative 
beliefs across the self-aspects constituting the working self-concept (Showers, 1992a, 
2000). Although individuals typically possess self-concepts that are mostly positive (e.g., 
Schwartz & Garamoni, 1986), most individuals have at least some important negative 
beliefs about the self. Importantly, the features of negative self-beliefs -  such as their 
importance -  have been shown to be more strongly correlated with mood and self-esteem 
than similar features of positive self-beliefs (e.g., Pelham & Swann, 1989; Showers, 
Abramson, & Hogan, 1998). Among the models of self-concept structure, evaluative 
organization is unique in that it accounts for both the category structure of speciGc self­
beliefs as well as the valence of those beliefs (Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2003). Because 
the evaluative organization of self-knowledge (i.e., the organization of positive and 
negative self-beliefs) is believed to affect the accessibility of specific self-beliefs, 
evaluative organization may moderate the impact of speciGc negative beliefs on self­
esteem and mood (e.g.. Showers, 1992a). This model recognizes that the content of the 
self-concept (e.g., the sheer number of negative self-beliefs) may have important 
implications for self-esteem and mood. It does suggest, however, that content alone may 
not be a sufficient predictor of psychological adjustment (Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2003). 
For example, two individuals may have self-concepts containing identical positive and 
negative content but have very different levels of self-esteem and mood depending on 
how these self-beliefs are organized.
The model of evaluative organization identiGes two types of self-structure:
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evaluatively compartmentalized and evaluatively integrative.' In compartmentalized self- 
concepts, positive and negative attributes or self-beliefs are separated into distinct self­
aspects such that each self-aspect contains primarily positive or primarily negative 
information about the self. For example, a compartmentalized individual may describe 
himself in his marriage as wu/TM, conng, and This
compartmentalized individual may also possess a self aspect that describes who he is 
when he plays basketball that consists of attributes such as wncoordmaW, .yef/ijA, 
and In contrast to compartmentalized self-concepts, integrative structures are
composed of self aspects containing a combination of positive and negative selfbeliefs. 
For example, an integrative individual may describe herself in her role as an elementary 
school teacher as AwTMomw.; and creufive but also ybrget/w/ and
The basic model of evaluative organization developed by Showers (1992a, 2000) 
predicts that when an individual's positive self aspects are considered to be relatively 
important or are made salient by current circumstances, compartmentalization will be 
associated with more positive mood and higher selfesteem than will integration. 
Compartmentalized individuals who possess positive self aspects that are important or 
salient are said to be The positive mood and high self
esteem associated with positive compartmentalization is due to these individuals having 
less access to their negative self beliefs because these beliefs have been relegated to 
relatively unimportant self-aspects that are rarely activated. However, if a 
compartmentalized individual's negative self aspects or attributes are important or made 
salient (i.e., neganve these negative self beliefs may flood the
individual and result in negative mood and low self-esteem. Under these circumstances,
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mood and self-esteem may be better maintained by individuals with an integrative self- 
concept structure because integration tends to activate both positive and negative self­
beliefs. Thus, integration may minimize the impact of unavoidable negative self-beliefs. 
Even though integrative self-aspects contain both positive and negative self-beliefs, these 
self-aspects may differ in their overall positivity. As a result, just as there are positively 
and negatively compartmentalized structures, positive and negative integration is also 
possible.
To sununarize the basic model of evaluative organization, positively 
compartmentalized structures should be associated with more positive mood and higher 
self-esteem than positively integrative structures. However, negatively 
compartmentalized structures should be associated with more negative mood and lower 
self-esteem than negatively integrative structures. Thus, compartmentalization should be 
associated with extreme levels of self-esteem and mood, whereas integration should be 
associated with more moderate levels of selfesteem and mood. The predictions of the 
basic model of evaluative organization have been supported by results 6om a variety of 
studies showing that the organization of self beliefs -  as measured by a variety of self 
descriptive tasks -  is associated with an individual's current level of mood or selfesteem 
(e.g., Rhodewalt, Madrian, & Cheney, 1998; Showers, 1992a, 1992b; Showers, 
Abramson, & Hogan, 1998; Showers & Kling, 1996; Showers & Ryff, 1996).
THE HIDDEN VULNERABILITY OF COMPARTMENTALIZED
SELF-CONCEPT STRUCTURES
The basic model of evaluative organization emphasizes the crucial role of self
knowledge in determining the consequences of compartmentalized structures and
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suggests that these stmctures may be vulnerable to shifts in the salience of particular self­
aspects (Showers, 1995). Because the consequences of evaluative organization are based 
on the accessibility of self-knowledge, this AiYWen of compartmentalized
self-concept structures may be limited to self-related affect such as self-esteem. The 
vulnerability of individuals with compartmentalized self-concepts to shifts in the salience 
of particular self-aspects should result in compartmentalized individuals experiencing 
both AfgAer AigAs and /ower /ows than individuals with integrative selfconcept 
structures. The reason compartmentalized individuals are believed to experience these 
fluctuations in self-esteem is their greater access to self-beliefs that are evaluatively 
consistent with current circumstances (positive self-beliefs are readily available when 
things are going well and negative self-beliefs are available when things are going 
poorly). The consequences of integrative structures, on the other hand, are not as reliant 
upon the current activation of particular self-aspects as compartmentalized structures. 
Thus, in contrast to compartmentalized individuals, individuals with an integrative self- 
concept structure should experience self-esteem that is less affected by current events. 
Although the moderate levels of self-esteem associated with integrative structures have 
often been considered to be a of integration (e.g.. Showers, Limke, & Zeigler-Hill, 
2004), this moderation of self-esteem may actually be a benefit if it also leads to self­
esteem that is more stable than that possessed by compartmentalized individuals.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH CONCERNING THE HIDDEN
VULNERABILITY OF COMPARTMENTALIZATION
Although previous research has focused primarily on the benefits of
compartmentalization for individuals with relatively positive self-aspects, the results of
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three recent studies have provided support for the contention that compartmentalized 
structures may be vulnerable to shifts in the salience of particular self-aspects. The first 
of these studies (Showers & Kling, 1996) examined how individuals with 
compartmentalized and integrative structures function in speciAc contexts. Previous 
studies had only focused on relations between self-concept structure and characteristic 
levels of self-esteem or mood which may have failed to capture the fact that 
compartmentalized individuals may have extreme and uncharacteristic emotional 
reactions when oppositely-valenced self-aspects are temporarily activated. Over time, the 
influence of the situation should fade and their normally important self-aspects should 
become salient once again, returning the individual to their characteristic levels of self­
esteem and mood. To examine this possibility, Showers and Kling assessed self-concept 
structure and then exposed participants to a sad mood induction that was intended to 
activate the participants' negative self-aspects. The results suggest that individuals with 
compartmentalized self-concept structures may be especially vulnerable to negative 
mood states. This vulnerability to negative mood states may lead to greater affective 
reactivity for compartmentalized individuals.
The second set of findings concerned how individuals organize information about
their romantic partners (i.e., partner-structure rather than self-structure; Showers &
Kevlyn, 1999). Although positively compartmentalized partner-structures were
associated with very positive feelings about the partner in the short-term, it was unclear
whether these positive feelings would translate into long-term relationship success. More
specifically, it seemed possible that individuals with compartmentalized partner-
structures may be vulnerable to shifts in the salience or perceived importance of their
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partner's negative attributes which would most likely result in extremely negative 
feelings toward the partner and possible relationship dissolution.
To examine the possibility that partner-structure may be associated with 
relationship outcomes, participants from the Showers and Kevlyn study were contacted 
one year later to assess the current status of their relationship (Showers & Zeigler-Hill, in 
press). The results of the study showed that individuals with positively 
compartmentalized partner-structures -  who had extremely positive attitudes toward their 
partners one year earlier -  were the most likely to have dissolved their relationship one 
year later (see Murray & Holmes, 1999 for similar results). This finding suggests that 
compartmentalization may represent an attempt to ignore the negative attributes 
possessed by one's partner by "sweeping them under the rug", whereas integration may 
lead individuals to acknowledge their partner's faults and possibly reach some form of 
resolution. Thus, compartmentalization may be associated with more positive feelings at 
the beginning of a relationship or when the relationship is functioning well; however, the 
benefits of these starry-eyed illusions appear to be relatively short-lived. In contrast, the 
greater realism that is believed to characterize integrative structures may be more useful 
for coping with the demands of a long-term relationship.
The final set of findings revealing the vulnerability of compartmentalized 
structures examined the relations between self-concept structure, narcissism, and self­
esteem instability (Rhodewalt, Madrian, & Cheney, 1998). It is generally agreed that 
narcissism is characterized by extreme reactions to potentially self-relevant events (e.g., 
Kemberg, 1975; Kohut, 1971, 1976); however, the reasons underlying this reactivity are
poorly understood. Based on previous work (e.g., Emmons, 1987; Rhodewalt & Morf,
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1995,1998; Westen, 1990), Rhodewalt and his colleagues examined whether narcissists 
possess self-concept structures that may lead to self-esteem instability (i.e., lower levels 
of self-complexity and higher levels of compartmentalization). Across two studies, 
narcissists with compartmentalized self-concept structures were found to possess self­
esteem that was highly unstable. Rhodewalt and his colleagues argued that 
compartmentalization may lead narcissistic individuals to overgeneralize the implications 
of evaluative events for feelings of self-worth because positive events increase the 
accessibility of exclusively positive self-knowledge whereas negative events activate 
purely negative self-knowledge.
HYPOTHESES
As noted above, evaluative organization is believed to influence the accessibility
of self-beliefs which may have implications for both the level and stabihty of self-esteem
(Rhodewalt, Madrian, & Cheney, 1998; Showers, 1995). Although individuals with a
positively compartmentalized self-concept have typically been shown to possess the
highest levels of trait self-esteem (Showers, 1992a), compartmentalized individuals may
be vulnerable to fluctuations in their moment-to-moment self-evaluations. The
application of this logic leads to two related hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 : Individuals with compartmentalized self-concept structures will
possess less stable self-esteem than individuals with integrative self-concepts.
Hypothesis 2: The self-esteem of individuals with compartmentalized self-
concept structures will exhibit greater lability in response to daily events and
stress than the self-esteem of individuals with integrative self-concepts.
Although clear predictions can be drawn for self-esteem, predictions concerning
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affect are less clear. It is important to note that state self-esteem and affect are 
conceptually and empirically distinguishable (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Although 
both state self-esteem and affect have both been found to respond to daily events (e.g., 
Nezlek & Gable, 2001), their covariation with daily events have been shown to be 
independent (Nezlek & Plesko, 2003). Because evaluative organization affects the 
accessibility of self-knowledge, the arguments concerning the moderating role evaluative 
organization should have in the relationship between daily events and emotional 
responses would seem to pertain solely to evaluations concerning the self. The reason for 
this proposed relationship is that feelings of self-worth should be directly linked with the 
self-knowledge that is readily available to the individual, whereas general affect may be 
influenced by factors that may or may not have consequences for the self. On the other 
hand, research concerning evaluative organization has consistently shown that 
compartmentalized individuals experience extreme levels of mood that would seem to 
imply a certain degree of mood instability (e.g.. Showers, 1992a, 1992b; Showers, 
Abramson, & Hogan, 1998). In fact, evaluative organization has been linked to clinically 
significant shifts in mood (Power, de Jong, & Lloyd, 2002). Thus, based on the previous 
literature, it is unclear whether evaluative organization will moderate the association 
between daily events and affective states. Because of these conflicting possibilities, the 
following exploratory hypothesis was included to examine whether the lability of 
compartmentalized individuals was unique to self-esteem or if evaluative organization 
would also moderate affective reactions to daily events.
Hypothesis 3: The affective states of individuals with compartmentalized self-
concept structures may exhibit greater lability in response to daily events and
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stress than the afïective states of individuals with integrative self-concepts.
ADVANTAGES OF EXPERIENCE-SAMPLING
Because the present study is concerned with changes in state self-esteem over
time, the present studies employed experience-sampling, which allows for the
documentation of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors within an individual's everyday life
rather than within a laboratory context (Christensen, Feldman Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, &
Kaschub, 2003). Experience-sampling procedures were originally developed to examine
the events experienced during a normal day as well as how subjective states change in
response to those events. Although this approach dates back to Flugel's (1925) 30-day
study of mood, it was not widely recognized until decades later (e.g., Brandstaetter, 1983;
Csikszentmihalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977). Experience-sampling differs from basic
self-report methodologies in some important ways: (1) individuals report their
experiences during the course of their normal lives rather than in the confines of the
laboratory; (2) individuals report their experiences much closer in time to the actual
experiences through a combination of online and short-term retrospective questions (e.g.,
Tfow yèe/ ai iAü /nomeni? and Tfow gir&yg (fizfyow erpenence and
(3) taking multiple measures over time allows for within-subject analyses (Christenson et
al., 2003; Schimmack, 2003; ScoUon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003). The particular form
of experience-sampling employed in the current study was interval-contingent
experience-sampling which is based on the passage of time rather than the occurrence of
a particular event (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003).
Experience-sampling reduces the problems associated with retrospective
evaluations of psychological ar^ustment and stress (see Dohrenwend, Dohrenwend,
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Dodson, & Shrout, 1984; Lazarus, DeLongis, Folkman, & Gruen, 1985) by focusing on 
external events and by asking participants to report on recent experiences rather than 
"averaging across" longer periods of time (Stone, Kessler, & Haythomwaite, 1991). 
Another important advantage of experience-sampling is that temporal covariation of 
internal states and external events can be examined (Larsen, Billings, & Cutler, 1996; 
Larsen & Kasimatis, 1990; Tennen, Suis, & Affleck, 1991). For example, this approach 
allows researchers to examine the extent to which psychological adjustment and stressful 
experiences occur within the same individual. This approach has been adopted by 
researchers interested in the link between daily events and mood (Bolger, DeLongis, 
Kessler, & Schilling, 1989; Bolger & Schilling, 1991; Caspi, Bolger, & Eckenrode, 1987; 
Clark & Watson, 1988; David, Green, Martin, & Suis, 1997; Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2000; 
Lewinsobn & Amenson, 1978; Marco & Suis, 1993; Rehm, 1978). These studies have 
consistently found that individuals experience more negative affect (e.g., anxiety) on 
days when they experience more negative events and more positive aHect (e.g., 
excitement) on days when they experience more positive events. This approach has also 
been used to examine the association between daily events and physical symptoms 
(Affleck, Tennen, Urrows, & Higgins, 1994; Aikens, Wallander, Bell, & McNorton,
1994; Halford, Cuddihy, & Mortimer, 1990; Stone, Reed, & Neale, 1987; Suis, Wan, & 
Blanchard, 1994).
STUDY 1
Overview of Study 1
Participants performed a self-descriptive card sorting task (Showers, 1992a;
Showers & Kling, 1996) and completed measures of state self-esteem, affect, daily
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events, and daily stress each day for 14 days. There were two basic predictions. The first 
prediction was that compartmentalized individuals would possess state self-esteem that 
was less stable than the state self-esteem of integrative individuals. The second prediction 
was that compartmentalized individuals would possess state self-esteem that was more 
labile in response to daily events and stress than the state self-esteem of integrative 
individuals.
Method
Participants were 129 undergraduates (40 men and 89 women) enrolled in 
introductory psychology at the University of Oklahoma who participated in exchange for 
research credit. The mean age of participants was 19.03 years (SD = 1.69). The 
racial/ethnic composition was 73% White, 8% Black, 5% Asian, 3% Native American, 
2% Hispanic, and 9% Other.
Afeufurgf
The content and structure of the self-concept was measured by the card sorting
task used by Showers (1992a; Showers & Kling, 1996). This card sorting task is based on
the task originally developed by Z^onc (1960) and extended by Linville (1985,1987).
For this task, participants were provided with a deck of 40 cards with each card
containing a potentially self-descriptive attribute. The deck contained 20 positive (e.g.,
outgoing, successful, mature, hardworking) and 20 negative attributes (e.g., unloved,
isolated, tense, irritable). Participants were given the following initial instructions, "Your
task is to think of the different aspects of yourself or your life and then sort the cards into
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groups where each group describes an aspect of yourself or your life." The remainder of 
the instructions were very similar to those reported by Showers and Kevlyn (1999). 
Participants were able to form as many groups as they needed, with as many or as few 
attributes as desired in each group. Attributes could be used in more than one group, and 
attributes that the respondent did not believe were self-descriptive did not have to be 
used. Table 1 presents sample card sorts from two participants in this study. After 
completing the card sorting task, participants indicated the positivity, negativity, and 
importance of each self-aspect generated during the card sorting task using 7-point 
scales.
Eva/wurive organzzafioM (pAi). The measure of evaluative organization is a phi 
coefficient (or Cramer's V; Cramer, 1974; Everitt, 1977) based on a chi-square statistic. 
Phi is an index of the deviation from chance of the number of positive and negative 
attributes in each self-aspect, where chance is the proportion of positive and negative 
attributes across all self-aspects. A &equency table is constructed that contains as many 
columns as there are groups in the individual's cards sort and two rows (number of 
positive attributes and number of negative attributes). The observed hequency values are 
obtained from the card sort. For example, 7 positive attributes and 3 negative attributes 
would be expected for a self-aspect containing 10 attributes if the entire card sort 
contained 30% negative attributes. These expected hequencies represent chance values 
for organizing positive and negative attributes without regard for their valence. The chi- 
square statistic computed using these expected and observed &equencies is normalized 
by dividing by the number of attributes in the sort (N):
, -
V n
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Phi can range &om 0 (perfect integration; positive and negative attributes are evenly 
distributed across all self-aspects) to 1 (perfect compartmentalization; each self-aspect is 
either purely positive or purely negative). Phi was only computed if two or more negative 
attributes were included in the card sort. This measure is independent of the number of 
self-aspects generated and the proportion of positive and negative attributes used during 
the card sorting task. Further detail on the computation of phi is provided by Showers and 
Kevlyn (1999).
(DJ). DI is a measure of the relative importance of 
positive and negative self-aspects (Pelham & Swann, 1989). DI is the within-subject 
correlation of participants' ratings of their self-aspects (i.e., positivity ratings minus 
negativity ratings) and the importance assigned to those self-aspects by the participants. 
DI can range hom -1 to 4-1, with positive scores indicating that positive self-aspects are 
considered more important than negative ones, and negative scores indicating that 
negative self-aspects are considered more important than positive ones (Showers, 1992a).
frqporiioM negative attnhute; (heg). The proportion of negative attributes is a 
measure of self-concept content that is calculated by dividing the number of negative 
attributes appearing in a respondent's card sort by the total number of attributes used.
The valence of the attributes was established by independent raters (Showers, 1992a). 
Trait
Participants completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 
1965), a well-validated measure of global self-regard (Blaskovich & Tomaka, 1991; 
Demo, 1985). Test-retest correlations greater than .80 have been reported (Rosenberg, 
1965; Silber & Tippett, 1965). Participants were instructed to complete the scale 
according to how they typically or generally feel about themselves. Responses were 
made on scales ranging 6om 1 (.^trangiy iTüagrge) to 5 (a'irongiy agree). For the current 
sample, the internal consistency of this measure was high, a  = .82.
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Levels of positive and negative affect were measured using the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) which is a reliable 
and well-validated self-report measure of affect. The PANAS consists of scales that 
measure positive (e.g., interested, enthusiastic, proud) and negative affect (e.g., 
distressed, scared, hostile). Positive and negative affect have been found to be distinct, 
higher-order dimensions of self-rated affect (e.g., Clark & Watson, 1988; Diener & 
Emmons, 1984; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Participants were 
instructed to complete the items according to how they typically or generally feel. 
Responses were made on scales ranging hrom 1 (vezy sfigAtfy or not at off) to 5 
(e%treme(y). For the present sample, the internal consistencies of these scales were high 
(.83 and .86 for positive affect and negative affect, respectively).
^gc^Deprg.s.ÿfon ^hventozy-Zf
The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a 21- 
item measure that assesses the severity of negative mood during the previous two weeks. 
Each item requires participants to endorse one of four options reflecting the severity of a 
given symptom. Scores from 0-3 are assigned to each option, with higher scores 
indicating more severe symptoms. The BDI-II has been found to possess high internal 
consistency (Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996; Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998; 
Steer, Kumar, Ranieri, & Beck, 1998) and adequate validity (Sprinkle et al., 2002; Steer, 
Ball, Ranieri, & Beck, 1997). For the current sample, the internal consistency of the 
BDI-II was quite high, a  = .93.
Aate anzf 7irKta6;7z(y
Participants were asked to complete a version of the RSES at 12 hour intervals for 
14 consecutive days.^ The RSES was modified so that participants were instructed to give 
the response that best reflected how they felt at the moment they completed the form.
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Responses were made on scales ranging &om 1 (/wagree) to 10 (ftrong/y
agree). For each participant, the within-subject standard deviation across the repeated 
assessments of state self-esteem served as the index of self-esteem instability, with higher 
standard deviations indicating more unstable selfesteem (M= 6.46, &0 = 4.51). As in 
previous studies (e.g., Greenier et at., 1999; Kemis, Granneman, & Barclay, 1989,1992), 
level of selfesteem and self-esteem instability were significantly correlated, r  = -.22, p  < 
.02.
Participants were asked to complete a version of the PANAS at 12 hour intervals 
for 14 consecutive days. The PANAS was modiGed so that participants were instructed to 
give the response that best reGected how they felt at the moment they completed the 
form. Responses were made on scales ranging &om 1 (very or not at a/Z) to 5
(exrre/MeZy).
DaZZy FZaj.;Z&y an(Z L^ZZ/k
Participants were asked to record their daily events each evening using a version 
of the Daily Hassles and Uplifts Scale (DeLongis, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1988). This 
measure consisted of 53 items concerning domains of life that may be sources of either 
stress or satisfaction (e.g., family, work, health, and money). This measure was modiGed 
so that parGcipants were instructed to indicate whether each item had been a hassle 
and/or upliA that day. 
ferceZvaZ S'Zr&yf
ParGcipants indicated their current level of sGess each evening by indicating their 
level of agreement with the statement "At this moment, I feel a great deal of sGess" on a 
scale ranging Aom 1 (a'ZrongZy (Ziyagree) to 10 (fZrongZy agree).
froce^Zwre
ParGcipants completed three laboratory sessions with 7 days between each
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laboratory session. During the first laboratory session, participants completed measures 
of self-concept content and structure, trait self-esteem, trait positive and negative affect, 
and depressive symptoms. Measures collected during the second and third laboratory 
sessions are not relevant to the present study. During the 14 days spanning the 3 
laboratory sessions, participants were instructed to complete state measures of self­
esteem, positive affect, and negative affect at 12 hour intervals (at approximately 10am 
and 10pm). Participants also completed measures of daily hassles, daily uplifts, and 
perceived stress every 24 hours (at approximately 10pm). To enhance compliance, 
participants received enough forms for one week during the first laboratory session and 
were instructed to return the completed measures approximately every 3 days.
Participants received forms for the second week during the second laboratory session and 
were again instructed to return the completed forms approximately every 3 days.^
Results
Of the 129 participants who began the study, 8 participants failed to complete the 
card sorting task or used fewer than two negative attributes. Analyses not involving the 
daily measures used the remaining 121 participants. However, for analyses involving the 
daily measures, data 6"om 12 participants were excluded due to failure to complete daily 
measures for 10 or more days. Analyses concerning daily measures were conducted using 
the 109 remaining participants. Daily measures were provided for all 14 days by 93% of 
these final participants.
Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for the 
measures of self-concept content and structure, trait self-esteem, positive and negative 
affect, negative mood as measured by the BDI-II, and self-esteem instability. On average, 
the participants' card sorts consisted of 7.1 self-aspects and contained 8.1 attributes per 
self-aspect. The card sorts contained an average of 15.7 (28%) negative attributes.
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Before testing the hypotheses for this study, the distributional properties of the 
observed variables were examined. The proportion of negative attributes in the card 
sorting task, scores on the BDI-II, daily hassles, and daily uplifts each showed a marked 
departure from normality. More specifically, each of these variables was positively 
skewed. In order to approximate a normal distribution, the proportion of negative 
attributes was arcsine transformed while BDI-II, daily hassles, and daily uplifts scores 
were subjected to square-root transformations (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).
The present analysis examined the association between self-concept structure and 
self-esteem instability by regressing self-esteem instability onto measures of self-concept 
structure and trait self-esteem."* For this hierarchical multiple regression, all predictor 
variables were centered for the purpose of testing interactions (Aiken & West, 1991). On 
Step 1, the main effect terms for evaluative organization and trait self-esteem were 
entered. On Step 2, the interaction of evaluative organization and trait self-esteem was 
entered.^ The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3. The hypothesized main effect 
of compartmentalization only approached conventional levels of significance, p = .16,/? 
< .10. However, this marginal main effect of compartmentalization was qualified by the 
interaction of evaluative organization and trait self-esteem which emerged, p = .19,^ < 
.05. Predicted values for this interaction are shown in Figure 1.
Because the interaction of evaluative organization and trait self-esteem was 
significant, the statistical procedures recommended by Aiken and West (1991) were 
conducted to describe the pattern of this interaction. To describe the interaction of two 
continuous variables, simple regression equations of self-esteem instability on evaluative 
organization and the interaction of evaluative organization and trait self-esteem were 
computed with the value of trait self-esteem at 1 &D above the mean (i.e., high trait self­
esteem) and 1 5D below the mean (i.e., low trait self-esteem). Simple slopes tests found
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that evaluative organization was not a significant predictor of self-esteem instability for 
individuals with low trait self-esteem (i.e., the slope of the regression line was not 
significantly different h"om 0), |3 = -.07, . However, for individuals with high trait self­
esteem, compartmentalization was associated with higher levels of self-esteem instability 
than was integration, p = .35, p  < .02. Taken together, these results show that when trait 
self-esteem is low, self-esteem is unstable regardless of whether individuals possess 
relatively compartmentalized or integrative self-concept structures. However, when trait 
self-esteem is high, integrative individuals report possessing self-esteem that is more 
stable than that possessed by compartmentalized individuals.
Overview q/"
The interval-contingent experience-sampling data from the present study 
comprised what is referred to as a multilevel, or hierarchically nested, data structure 
because observations at one level of analysis (i.e., days) were nested within another level 
of analysis (i.e., individuals). As a result of this hierarchical structure, observations were 
not independent (Jaccard & Wan, 1993; Marco, Neale, Schwartz, Shiffman, & Stone, 
1999; Schwartz & Stone, 1998; West & Hepworth, 1991). Due to the hierarchical 
structure of the data, a series of multilevel random coefficient models (MRCM) using the 
program HLM (Bryk, Raudenbush, & Congdon, 1998) were employed in the present 
study. In accordance with de Leeuw and Kreft (1995), the term "MRCM" is employed to 
avoid confusing a type of analysis (MRCM) with the name of a technique (HLM). 
MRCM conceptually involves two steps. First, a regression analysis is performed at the 
within-person level. For example, in the current study, state psychological adjustment 
was predicted 6om daily events for each individual. Second, the between-person level 
examines whether the regression slopes obtained &om the within-person level differ 
across individuals, depending on the level of an individual-difference variable. For 
example, in the current study, evaluative organization was believed to moderate the
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within-person relationship between daily events and state psychological adjustment.
One of the most important advantages of MRCM over comparable ordinary-least- 
squares (OLS) analyses is that MRCM provides more accurate parameter estimates than 
OLS methods such as repeated measures ANOVA or using within-person correlations as 
criterion variables (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998; Kreft & 
de Leeuw, 1998; Nezlek & Gable, 2001). The increased accuracy of parameter estimates 
in MRCM is due to the modeling of within-person coefficients as random effects rather 
than as fixed effects (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Nezlek & Gable, 2001). For the present 
study, the exact days over which data were collected were not especially important to the 
hypotheses of interest. The days comprising the study were sampled &om a population of 
days intended to represent the typical experiences of the participants. Although the 
coefficients would differ slightly if an alternative sample of days had been used, these 
analyses assume that those coefficients would have been equally valid. Because these 
within-person coefficients are being sampled from each participant's larger population of 
possible coefficients, the coefficients describing within-person relationships are modeled 
as random effects (Nezlek & Zyzniewski, 1998). These within-person coefGcients are 
modeled as random by using a combination of maximum likelihood and Bayesian 
procedures (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Because parameter estimates 6om diSerent 
levels are not modeled as independent, the reliability of within-person responses is used 
to estimate the variance of within-person parameters. The result is that as an individual's 
responses increase in reliability, the weight assigned to that individual's mean also 
increases. This precision weighting is used to produce empirical Bayes estimates of 
parameters allowing for the separation of fixed and random parameter variance which are 
combined in OLS analyses (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The advantages of MRCM over 
OLS methods are even greater when the number of days sampled are relatively small or 
the number of days sampled varies across individuals (Nezlek, 2001; Nezlek &
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Zyzniewski, 1998). A full description of the advantages of MRCM over comparable OLS 
techniques for analyzing experience-sampling data has been presented previously (e.g., 
Nezlek, 2001; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
The present analyses had two goals: (1) to examine the covariation between state 
psychological adjustment (i.e., self-esteem, positive affect, and negative affect) and daily 
stress (i.e., daily hassles, daily uplifts, and stress) and (2) to examine how within-person 
relationships between these measures vary as a function of evaluative organization (i.e., 
is the within-person relationship between state self-esteem and daily negative events 
stronger for compartmentalized individuals than it is for integrative individuals).
Daycnpfivg ReZiab/hYy q/" Meosway q/"
Descriptive statistics for the daily measures are provided in Table 4. These 
descriptive statistics were obtained by an unconditional model for each daily measure.
An unconditional model contains no terms other than intercepts at any level of the model. 
The Level 1 and Level 2 equations were as follows:
Level 1 (within-person): y^  = + r^  ;
Level 2 (between-person) : Poj -  Too + -
In this Level 1 model, y;j is a measure of state psychological adjustment (i.e., self­
esteem, positive affect, or negative affect) or daily events (i.e., daily hassles, daily uplifts, 
or perceived stress), for person) on day i, is a random coefficient representing the 
mean of y for person) (across the i days for which each person provided data), r^ j 
represents the error associated with each measure, and the variance of r^  constitutes the 
within-person error variance. In this Level 2 model, represents the grand mean of the 
person-level means from the within-person model, u^ represents the error of and the 
variance of Ug: constitutes the between-person error variance. Each of the daily measures 
had a reliability coefficient of .90 or above (see Table 4). To determine the reliability of
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self-esteem instability during the course of the study, within-subject standard deviations 
were computed for three consecutive 4-day periods. The reliability coefficient for self­
esteem instability was .80 which suggests that the within-subject standard deviation 
measure of self-esteem instability is reliable.
A two-level MRCM was used to examine relationships between evaluative 
organization and daily measures of psychological adjustment and stress. These effects are 
examined at Level 2 by modeling the variability of the coeSicient ûom the Level 1 
model representing the group mean. These types of analyses are referred to as a "means 
as outcomes" analyses (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Nezlek & Zyzniewski, 1998). To 
examine whether the average scores for the daily measures of psychological adjustment 
and stress were associated with evaluative organization, the following Level 2 model was 
used:
Ppi = Yoo + Yo,(PHI) + %i- 
If Yo; is significantly different from 0, then the relationship between evaluative 
organization and the daily measure is significant. The only significant association that 
emerged &om these analyses was a negative association between evaluative organization 
and state self-esteem such that compartmentalized individuals tended to experience lower 
levels of state self-esteem, ^  = -2.76, p  < .02. On average, individuals 1 AD above the 
sample mean for evaluative organization tended to experience state self-esteem that was 
2.76 points lower than individuals at the sample mean. Correspondingly, individuals 1 
6D below the sample mean for evaluative organization tended to experience state self­
esteem that was 2.76 points higher than individuals at the sample mean.
To examine within-person relationships between daily events and state 
psychological ac^ustment a two-level MRCM was used. A regression equation was
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estimated for each participant which described the association between daily stress and 
state psychological adjustment. For example, the Level 1 model examining daily hassles 
and uplifts was as follows:
yy = Poj + PijHASSLES + P^jUPLIFTS + r^j, 
in which y is an ac^ustment score for person j on day i, is a random coefficient 
representing the intercept for person j, Py is a random coeHicient for daily hassles, Pzj is  ^
random coefficient for daily uplifts, and r^  represents error. Daily hassles and daily 
uplifts were entered together in order to differentiate the impact of positive and negative 
events.
The average number of daily hassles and uplifts varied considerably across 
persons and days, and (he average number of daily uplifts was higher than the average 
number of daily hassles (11.56 vs. 8.41, t[108] = -4.33, p < .001).^ To eliminate the 
influence of these differences on parameter estimates, event scores were group-mean 
centered, with "group" being defined as the individual participant (Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002). Because of this group-mean centering, coefficients for daily events described 
relationships between the deviation hom each person's average number of events and 
deviations from that person's average level of ac^ustment.
Within-person relationships between daily stress and psychological adjustment 
were examined by analyzing Level 1 (within-person) coefficients at Level 2 (between- 
persons) using the following model:
Intercept: Pqj = Yoo + ;
Daily Hassles: + u^ ;
Daily Uplifts: = Y20 + Uzj -
In this model, Yoo represented the average of the within-person intercepts, and Y,o and Y20  
represented the average of the daily hassles and daily uplifts slopes, respectively. All 
. three within-person coefficients are modeled as random (i.e., Ug:, u,:, and u^ j terms are
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included). The results of these analyses are presented in Table 5.
As expected, there were significant associations between daily events -  both 
hassles and uplifts -  and state psychological adjustment. The ^ , 0  slopes representing the 
association of daily hassles with state self-esteem and state negative affect were 
significantly different from 0, |^s| > 1.83, ps < .001. The relationship between daily 
hassles and positive affect did not approach conventional levels of significance (B = -.41, 
M.y). The three y^ o slopes representing the relationships between daily uplifts and measures 
of state psychological ac^ustment (i.e., self-esteem, positive affect, and negative affect) 
were significantly different 6om 0, |.Bs| > 1.06, y?s < .04. Across all participants, state 
self-esteem was lower and negative affect was higher on days when the number of daily 
hassles reported were higher than on days when the number of daily hassles were lower. 
Conversely, psychological a(^ustment was higher on days when participants reported 
more daily uplifts.
A similar set of analyses were conducted for percieved stress. The results of these 
analyses are presented in Table 5. Significant associations were found between stress and 
each measure of state psychological ai^ustment, |^s| > .51, ps < .001. Across aU 
participants, state psychological a^ustment was lower on days when stress was higher. 
The similarity between these results and those for daily events are not surprising given 
the strong association between daily events and perceived stress. The average coefficient 
for the within-person relationship between perceived stress and daily hassles was B = .81, 
p  < .001, and the average coefficient for daily uplifts was = -.42, p  < .001. Not 
surprisingly, participants reported higher levels of stress on days when they reported 
more daily hassles and fewer daily uplifts.
Between DmYy Bvent; Btute fyycAo/ogicaZ v4<ÿw.ytnzent
This analysis examined how person-level diffierences in evaluative organization
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moderated relationships between daily events and state psychological adjustment. To 
determine if the within-person relationships described in the previous analyses varied as 
a function of individual differences in evaluative organization, coefficients &om within- 
person models were analyzed at the between-person level using a model such as the 
following:
Poj = Yoo + Yoi(PHI) + Uqj;
P,j=7io + Yn(PHI) + u,j;
p2j=Y20 + Y2l(PHI) + U2j- 
In these models, the moderating effect of evaluative organization was tested by the 
significance of the y,, and y;, coefficients (for daily hassles and daily uplifts, 
respectively). These coefficients can be interpreted like standardized regression 
coefficients because person-level variables were standardized prior to analysis (Nezlek & 
Plesko, 2003). The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 6. For state self­
esteem, evaluative organization moderated only daily hassle slopes, .8 = -.74,^ < .05.
The predicted values for this analysis are shown in Figure 2. The y,, coefficient for the 
state self-esteem analysis was -.74 which means that for every 1.0 unit change in 
evaluative organization (a 1 57) change), daily hassles slopes changed -.74. The mean 
daily hassles slope for state self-esteem was -1.83 (see Table 5), so the predicted daily 
hassles slope for a person 1 57) above the mean on evaluative organization was -2.57, 
whereas it was -1.09 for a person 1 57) below the mean. This indicates the state self­
esteem of compartmentalized individuals was more closely associated with daily hassles 
than was the self-esteem of integrative individuals. To examine the pattern of this cross- 
level interaction, simple slopes tests were employed that have been adapted for multilevel 
models (Curran, Bauer, & Willoughby, in press-a, in press-b). These tests are based on 
the procedure introduced by Aiken and West (1991). These analyses showed that 
individuals with compartmentalized self-concept structures (1 57) above the mean for
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evaluative organization) experienced a significant decrease in state self-esteem as their 
level of daily hassles increased, ^  = -2.60, p  < .001. Individuals with an integrative self- 
concept structure (1 below the mean for evaluative organization) also experienced a 
significant decrease in state self-esteem as daily hassles increased, B = -1.11, j? < .03. 
Taken together, these results reveal that both compartmentalized and integrative 
individuals show significant decreases in state self-esteem on days when more daily 
hassles are experienced; however, the decrease in state self-esteem experienced by the 
compartmentalized individuals is significantly greater than that experienced by 
integrative individuals.^ Evaluative organization did not moderate the within-person 
relationships between positive or negative affect and daily events.
A similar set of analyses were conducted for perceived stress. The results of these 
analyses are summarized in Table 6. Evaluative organization moderated the relationship 
between state self-esteem and stress. Similar to the results for daily hassles, these results 
show the state self-esteem of compartmentalized individuals to have a stronger 
association with stress than the state self-esteem of integrative individuals, 5  = -.39, p  < 
.01.  ^The predicted values for this analysis are shown in Figure 3. Simple slopes tests 
found that the state self-esteem of individuals with compartmentalized self-concept 
structures decreased significantly as perceived stress increased, = -1.21, p < .001. 
Integrative individuals also showed declines in state self-esteem as perceived stress 
increased, ^  = -.42, p < .01. These analyses show that the state self-esteem of both 
compartmentalized and integrative individuals is associated with stress, but the decreases 
in state selfesteem experienced by compartmentalized individuals are greater than those 
experienced by integrative individuals. The results of this analysis were similar when 
daily events were included in the model. The moderating effect of evaluative 
organization approached significance for both stress = -.23, p  < .06) and daily hassles 
(B = -.62, p  < .10). This suggests that the moderating effect of evaluative organization for
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stress is unique 6om the moderating effect for daily hassles. Evaluative organization did 
not moderate the within-person relationships between perceived stress and positive or 
negative affect.
In studies involving experience-sampling methodology, it is important to 
determine if artifacts such as fatigue or the number of days a participant contributed data 
influenced within-person coefficients (Nezlek & Plesko, 2003). To examine temporal 
trends in the data, analyses were conducted that included the day of the study at Level 1 
(within-person level). These analyses found no significant relationship between the day 
of the study and daüy measures of psychological at^ustment or stress. The potential also 
existed for participants to provide data for different numbers of days which allows for the 
possibility that such differences were associated with the results of the present study. To 
examine this possibility, analyses were conducted that included the number of days a 
participant contributed data at Level 2 (between-person level). These analyses found no 
signiGcant associations between the amount of contributed data and the within-person 
coefficients described above. Thus, it does not appear that fatigue or the number of days 
participants contributed data influenced the results of the present study.
Discussion
The hypothesized relationship between compartmentalized self-concept structures 
and self-esteem instability emerged only for those individuals with high trait self-esteem. 
Importantly, this effect was driven by the stable self-esteem of individuals with 
integrative self-concepts and high trait self-esteem. This result may suggest that the 
advantages of integration, at least in terms of self-esteem stability, are restricted to those 
individuals who possess relatively positive self-evaluations. It is possible that some 
threshold level of positivity (e.g., high self-esteem or a high proportion of positive self­
beliefs) must be met before integration is able to protect and stabilize self-esteem. This
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result may also suggest that the high level of trait self-esteem which characterizes 
positively compartmentalized individuals may be difficult for these individuals to sustain 
with the result being Sequent fluctuations in state self-esteem. It is also important to 
notice that individuals with low trait self-esteem had relatively unstable self-esteem 
regardless of their self-concept structure. This finding is consistent with the negative 
correlation that is typically found between self-esteem level and self-esteem instability 
(see K.emis & Waschull, 1995 for a review).
The hypothesis concerning the lability of state self-esteem was supported by the 
results of the present study. More specifically, the state self-esteem of compartmentalized 
individuals appeared to be significantly more responsive to daily hassles and perceived 
stress than the state self-esteem of integrative individuals. One possible reason for this 
observed pattern is that negative experiences (e.g., daily hassles or perceived stress) may 
activate purely negative self-aspects either directly or indirectly through the activation of 
self-beliefs contained within those self-aspects of compartmentalized individuals. The 
activation of these negative self-aspects may temporarily overwhelm the 
compartmentalized individual and result in significant decreases in state self-esteem. The 
failure to find self-esteem increases among compartmentalized individuals on days with 
high numbers of daily uplifts may be due to individuals typically having stronger 
reactions to negative events than to positive events (Appel, Blomkvist, Persson, & 
Sjoberg, 1980; Myers, Lindenthal, Pepper, & Ostrander, 1972; Persson, 1988a, 1988b, 
1988c; Vinokur & Selzer, 1975). It is also possible that the measures employed in the 
present study were less sensitive to positive events and positive psychological 
adjustment. Further, the lack of effects for state positive or negative affect suggests that 
the lability of compartmentalized individuals occurs primarily for self-evaluation rather 
than indicating a more global instability. This supports Showers' (1995) contention that 
the consequences of evaluative organization are due to the accessibility of self-
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knowledge rather than directly affecting mood.
STUDY 2
Despite the supportive results of Study 1, a number of questions concerning the 
association between evaluative organization and self-esteem lability remain unanswered. 
One of these questions concerns whether the findings &om Study 1 could be replicated. 
To address this question, hypotheses concerning self-esteem instability and self-esteem 
lability were included in Study 2 which were identical to those presented in Study 1. 
Another question of interest concerned whether the state self-esteem of 
compartmentalized individuals is especially responsive to certain kinds of events. More 
specifically, it is possible that compartmentalized individuals may be more reactive to 
daily social events than to daily achievement events because the desire for interpersonal 
acceptance and to form strong social bonds is believed to be a fundamental human 
motivation (Baumeister & Tice, 1990; Baumeister & Leaiy, 1995; Bowlby, 1969; Hogan, 
1982). Leary and his colleagues have shown that self-esteem is closely associated with 
feelings of social rejection (Leary, Cottrell, & Phillips, 2001; Leary et al., 2003; Leary, 
Haupt, Strausser, & Chokel, 1998; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). This 
sensitivity to social rejection may be especially true for individuals with unstable self­
esteem because they may depend primarily on social relationships to maintain their 
fragile self-views (Barnett & Gotlib, 1988). Previous research has supported this 
contention by showing that individuals with unstable self-esteem are more likely than 
individuals with stable self-esteem to focus on daily events that pertain to social 
acceptance or rejection (Greenier et al., 1999). Because of the proposed link between 
compartmentalization and unstable self-esteem, this increased sensitivity to social events 
may also describe compartmentalized individuals. Therefore, events pertaining to social 
acceptance or rejection may be especially important to individuals with 
compartmentalized self-concept structures regardless of their specific negative self-
39
beliefs.
Hypothesis 4: The self-esteem of individuals with compartmentalized self- 
concepts will exhibit greater lability in response to daily events pertaining to 
social rejection or social acceptance than the self-esteem of individuals with 
integrative selfooncepts.
Because self-esteem instability is only one of the ways in which &agile self­
esteem may be distinguished &om secure self-esteem (Kemis & Paradise, 2002), 
evaluative organization may be associated with another model of &agile self-esteem such 
as contingent self-esteem. Individuals with contingent self-esteem tend to base their 
feelings of self-worth upon meeting certain standards. Although self-esteem instability 
and contingent self-esteem have certain common features such as reflecting hragile, 
poorly-anchored feelings of self-worth that require continual validation (Kemis & 
Goldman, 2003; Kemis, Paradise, et al., 2000), these are clearly distinct constmcts (see 
Kemis & Paradise, 2002; Kemis & Goldman, 2003). As with unstable self-esteem, 
contingent self-esteem may be related to self-concept structure. More speciGcally, the 
shifts in the salience of negative self-aspects believed to characterize compartmentalized 
individuals may lead these individuals to focus on gamering social ^ipmval and meeting 
certain standards in an e@brt to maintain their rather tenuous positive self-evaluations. 
This focus may be manifested as self-esteem contingencies within certain life domains 
such as those proposed by Crocker and her colleagues (Crocker, Karpinski, Quinn, & 
Chase, 2003; Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003; Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). 
Although Crocker and her colleagues emphasize that individuals may differ in which 
domains are important for their self-esteem, examining the degree to which any sort of 
self-esteem contingency is operative may also prove useful (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1995; 
Kemis & Waschull, 1995; Rogers, 1959). If compartmentahzation is associated with both 
unstable self-esteem and contingent self-esteem, then this would provide convergent
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support for the idea that compartmentalized individuals possess 6agile self-esteem. 
Hypothesis 5: Individuals with compartmentalized self-concept structures will 
possess self-esteem that is more contingent on external validation and 
achievement than individuals with integrative self-concept structures.
Overview of Study 2 
In order to replicate and extend the self-esteem instability and self-esteem lability 
results from Study 1, participants in the present study performed a self-descriptive card 
sorting task and completed measures of psychological adjustment and daily events each 
day. To determine whether the self-esteem of compartmentalized individuals was 
especially sensitive to social events, the present study employed a measure of daily 
events that assessed both social events and achievement events. To extend the Study I 
findings concerning the relation between evaluative organization and fragile self-esteem, 
contingent self-esteem was also examined in the present study.
Method
Participants were 153 undergraduates (50 men and 103 women) enrolled in 
introductory psychology at the University of Oklahoma who participated in exchange for 
research credit. The mean age of participants was 19.03 years (6D = 2.07). The 
racial/ethnic composition was 80% White, 5% Black, 4% Asian, 4% Native American, 
5% Hispanic, and 2% Other.
Mgofwrgj
The measures of self-concept content and structure, trait self-esteem (a = .87), 
positive affect (a  = .84), and negative affect (a  = .88) were unchanged from Study 1. For 
each participant, the within-subject standard deviation across the repeated assessments of 
state self-esteem served as the index of self-esteem instability, with higher standard 
deviations indicating more unstable self-esteem (M = 4.96,5D = 3.78). In the current
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sample, level of self-esteem and self-esteem instability were significantly correlated, r  = - 
.35, p  < .001. A new measure of daily events and a measure of contingent self-esteem 
were added for the present study.
Duzfy EvcMü
Participants were asked to record their daily events each evening using a modihed 
version of the Daily Events Survey (DES; Butler, Hokanson, & Flynn, 1994). The DES 
consists of 40-items that are appropriate for college students. The modihcations to the 
DES employed in the current study were based on those used in previous research (e.g., 
Nezlek & Gable, 2001; Nezlek & Plesko, 2003). In the present study, 22 of the 40 events 
were employed (12 positive and 10 negative events). Social and achievement domains 
were equally represented. Events included, "Was excluded or left out by my group of 
friends," "Fell behind in coursework or duties," and "Classmate, teacher, co-worker, or 
hiend complimented me on my abilities." In addition, four items (positive social event, 
negative social event, positive achievement event, and negative achievement event) were 
created to measure other events that may have occurred. For example, other positive 
achievement events were measured using the item, "Had other type of pleasant event (not 
listed above) concerning performance at school, work, or another activity." Each 
evening, participants rated each event using the following scale: 0 = mot occur, 1 = 
occurraf o/uf Mot 2 = occurrcff o/uf fomcwAot iw^orro/zf, 3 = occurrcùl owf
pretty zzrportont, and 4 = occurrezf onzf extremefy f/t^orto/zt. The number of positive 
events that occurred each day and the number of negative events that occurred were 
calculated.
Co/ztzMgemczej: q/'6'e(/^lFbrt/z c^zz/e
Contingencies of self-worth were assessed using a measure developed by Crocker 
and colleagues (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003; Crocker & Wolfe,
2001). The measure consists of 35-items which assess each of seven domains on which
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college students might base their feelings of self-worth. These domains are: others' 
approval (e.g., "I can't respect myself if others don't respect me"; a  = .81), physical 
appearance (e.g., "When I think I look attractive, I feel good about myself; a  = .75), 
outdoing others in competition (e.g., "Knowing that I am better than others on a task 
raises my self-esteem"; a  = .87), academic competence (e.g., "Doing well in school gives 
me a sense of self-respect"; a  -  .80), family love and support (e.g., "Knowing that my 
family members love me makes me feel good about myself; a  = .82), being a virtuous 
or moral person (e.g., "Doing something I know is wrong makes me lose my self- 
respect"; a  = .84), and God's love (e.g., "I feel worthwhile when I have God's love"; a  = 
.95). A composite score of general self-esteem contingency was calculated by summing 
across all items (a  = .90).
frocgffwrg
Participants completed measures of self-concept content and structure, trait self­
esteem, trait positive and negative affect, and contingencies of self-worth during a 90- 
minute laboratory session. Participants were instructed to complete state measures of 
self-esteem, positive and negative affect, and the measure of daily events at 24 hour 
intervals (at approximately 10pm each day) for 7 consecutive days. Participants were 
scheduled to return to the laboratory one week later to participate in Study 3.
Results
Of the 153 participants who began the study, 10 participants failed to coihplete 
the card sorting task or used fewer than two negative attributes and 5 participants failed 
to complete measures relevant to the current study. Analyses not involving the daily 
measures used the remaining 138 participants. Due to failure to complete daily measures 
for 5 or more days, data from 20 participants were excluded from analyses involving the 
daily measures. Analyses concerning daily measures were conducted using the 118 
remaining participants. Daily measures were provided for all 7 days by 96% of these
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final participants.
Table 7 presents the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for all 
variables. On average, the participants' card sorts consisted of 5.8 self-aspects and 
contained 8.0 attributes per self-aspect. The card sorts contained an average of 12.3 
(28%) negative attributes.
As in Study 1, the distributional properties of the observed variables were 
examined before testing hypotheses. The only variable showing a marked departure from 
normality was the proportion of negative attributes in the card sorting task which was 
positively skewed. In order to approximate a normal distribution, the proportion of 
negative attributes was arcsine transformed (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).
To replicate the association found between evaluative organization and self­
esteem instability in Study 1, a hierarchical multiple regression was performed. As in 
Study 1, the main effect terms for evaluative organization and trait self-esteem were 
entered on Step 1. On Step 2, the interaction of evaluative organization and trait self­
esteem was entered.^ Significant main effects emerged for both evaluative organization,
P = .25, p < .01, and trait self-esteem, P = -.28,/? < .01. Individuals with a 
compartmentalized self-concept structure or with low trait self-esteem reported less 
stable self-esteem. The interaction of evaluative organization and trait self-esteem did not 
reach conventional levels of significance, P = -.14,/? < .11.
D&ycrÿnvg Anfüficj Dof/y Mgajwra;
Descriptive statistics for the daily measures are provided in Table 8. These 
descriptive statistics were obtained by an unconditional model (i.e., a ntodel containing 
no terms other than intercepts at any level of the model) for each measure of state 
psychological ac^ustment or daily stress. Each of the daily measures had a reliability
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coefficient above .90.
Ævo/wan've Orgamizan'o» oMcf DaiZy Mea.îwrgf 
Two-level MRCMs were used to examine relationships between evaluative 
organization and daily measures of stress and state psychological ac^ustment. These 
effects are examined at Level 2 by modeling the variability of the coefficient &om the 
Level 1 model representing the group mean. As in Study 1, a significant negative 
association emerged between evaluative organization and the average level of state self­
esteem, B = -2.35, p  < .03. Compartmentalized individuals reported lower levels of state 
self-esteem than integrative individuals.
Dni/y Evenü Ante fyycAo/ogzcn/
To examine within-person relationships between daily stress and state 
psychological adjustment two-level MRCMs were used. The Level 1 model described the 
association between daily stress and psychological acjustment. As expected, there were 
significant associations between positive and negative daily events and state 
psychological adjustment. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 9. The 
slopes representing the association between daily events and psychological acjustment 
were significantly different from 0, |Bs| > .41, ps < .01. Across all participants, 
psychological acjustment was higher on days when more positive events were reported 
and lower on days when more negative events were reported.
Bvn/unhve OrgnniznBo/z (zs a MWerntor q/" P F z t / z m - f Re/atfonfAÿs 
BefwggM Dnz/y Aresg OMùf Ante ffycAo/ogzcn/ yffÿzzÿhMgMt 
These analyses are conceptual replications of analyses &om Study 1 which 
examined whether evaluative organization moderated the within-person relationship 
between daily events and state psychological acjustment. The results of these analyses 
are summarized in Table 10. As in Study 1, these coefficients can be interpreted like 
standardized regression coefficients because person-level variables were standardized
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prior to analysis (Nezlek & Plesko, 2003). Evaluative organization moderated the 
relationships between state self-esteem and both positive and negative events. The 
predicted values for positive events are shown in Figure 4 and the predicted values for 
negative events are shown in Figure 5. Simple slopes tests were employed to examine the 
patterns of these cross-level interactions. These analyses showed that Individuals with 
compartmentalized self-concept structures experienced a significant increase in state self­
esteem as their level of positive events increased, ^  = .71,p < .001, as well as a 
significant decrease in state self-esteem as their level of negative events increased, ^  = - 
.65,/) < .01. Individuals with an integrative self-concept structure also experienced a 
significant increase in state self-esteem as their level of positive events increased, .8 = 
.25,/) < .02, but did not experience a significant decrease in state self-esteem as their 
level of negative events increased, 8  = -.45,7w. Taken together, these results suggest that 
the state self-esteem of compartmentalized individuals is more closely associated with 
both positive and negative daily events than the state self-esteem of integrative 
individuals. Evaluative organization did not moderate the within-person relationships of 
daily events with positive or negative affect.
Eva/watzve Organzzahon os a q/'PFfYAm-fgrson Ee/ahonsAzpy
Eefween Eocmf Events onzl Efafe EsycAo/ogzcaf vfzÿusnnenf
To examine whether the psychological ac^ustment of compartmentalized 
individuals is most closely associated with social events, the measure of daily events was 
decomposed into social and achievement events. Each type of event (i.e., positive social, 
negative social, positive achievement, and negative achievement) was entered 
simultaneously at the within-person level of the model. The results of these analyses are 
presented in Table 11. These results confirmed that both social and aclnevement events 
were linked to state self-esteem and affect. Analyses were then conducted to examine 
whether evaluative organization moderated the relationships between these events and
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State psychological adjustment. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 12. 
For state self-esteem, the moderating effect of evaluative organization observed in Study 
1 for the measure of daily hassles was replicated for both positive social events, 5  = .29, 
/)<  .01, and negative social events, ^  = -.43, p  < .02, but not for positive or negative 
achievement events, [Bs| < .20, n.;. The predicted values for positive social events are 
shown in Figure 6 and the predicted values for negative social events are shown in Figure 
7. Simple slopes tests were employed to examine the patterns of these cross-level 
mteractions. These analyses showed that individuals with compartmentalized self- 
concept structures experienced a signiGcant increase in state selfesteem as their level of 
positive social events increased, ^  = .74,/? < .01, as well as a signiGcant decrease in state 
self-esteem as their level of negaGve social events increased, ^  = -1.10, p  < .001. 
Individuals with an integraGve self concept structure did not experience a signiGcant 
increase in state self-esteem as their level of posiGve social events increased, ^  = .16, Tw, 
but did experience a signiGcant decrease in state self-esteem as their level of negaGve 
social events increased, 5  = -.25,/; < .05. Taken together, these results suggest that the 
state selfesteem of compartmentalized individuals is more closely associated with social 
events than the state self-esteem of integraGve individuals.
Similar to the results for state self-esteem, evaluaGve organizaGon moderated the 
relaGonship of daily events with state posiGve affect and state negaGve affect. More 
speciGcally, the affect of compartmentalized individuals was more responsive to posiGve 
social events than the affect of integraGve individuals, |^s| > .27, /?s < .05. The results of 
these analyses are presented in Table 12. No other moderating effects of evaluaGve 
organizaGon emerged Gom these analyses.
yërG/ôcü: UMd to Fa/idzty
To examme whether faGgue had an iuGuence on the results of the present study, 
analyses were conducted that included the day of the study at Level 1 (the within-person
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level). No significant association between the day of the study and daily measures of 
psychological adjustment or stress emerged 6om these analyses. To examine the 
possibility that differences in the number of days participants provided data may 
influence within-person coefBcients, analyses were conducted that included the number 
of days a participant contributed data at Level 2 (the between-person level). These 
analyses found no significant associations between the amount of contributed data and 
the within-person coefficients described above. Thus, it does not appear that the results of 
the present study were influenced by fatigue or the number of days participants 
contributed data.
OrgonizafzoM q / C o n t i / z g g M c i e a  qfS'eÿ-ffbrïA 
To examine the association between evaluative organization and contingencies of 
self-worth, a hierarchical multiple regression was performed for the composite score 
representing global self-esteem contingency as well as each of the seven domains on 
which self-esteem may be contingent. On Step 1, the main efkct terms for evaluative 
organization, differential importance, and proportion of negative attributes were entered. 
On Step 2, the two-way interactions of the main effect terms were entered.Results of 
the analysis for composite contingent self-esteem score are shown in Table 13. The main 
effect of evaluative organization, p = .21,/? < .03, was qualified by the interaction of 
evaluative organization and differential importance, P = .26, < .01. Predicted values 
showing the interaction of evaluative organization and differential Importance for 
contingent self-esteem are shown in Figure 8. The slope of the simple regression line at 1 
5D above the mean for differential importance was signiGcantly different 6om zero, P = 
.47,/) < .001. The slope of the regression line at 1 SD below the mean for differential 
importance was not significantly different &om zero, P = -.04, /w. These results suggest 
that evaluative organization is associated with contingent self-esteem when positive self­
aspects are considered to be most important. More specifically, individuals with a
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positively compartmentalized self-concept structure tended to have self-esteem that is 
more contingent than positively integrative individuals. Similar interactions of evaluative 
organization and differential importance were found for God's love, physical appearance, 
and family love and support, Ps > .18, ps < .05. Main effects of evaluative organization 
also emerged for others' approval and being a virtuous and moral person such that 
compartmentalized individuals possessed more contingent self-esteem, ps >.19,ps < .04. 
No significant effects emerged for academic competence or outdoing others in 
competition.
Discussion
As hypothesized, individuals with compartmentalized self-concept structures had 
less stable self-esteem than individuals with integrative structures. Although the main 
effect of evaluative organization was not significantly qualified by the interaction of 
evaluative organization and trait self-esteem as in Study 1, it remains possible that the 
stabilizing effects of integration emerge primarily for individuals with relatively positive 
self-concepts. The findings concerning the lability of state self-esteem in response to 
daily stress were very similar to those &om Study 1. The state self-esteem of 
compartmentalized individuals appeared to be more responsive to both positive and 
negative daily events than the state self-esteem of integrative individuals. In addition to 
replicating the effects 6om Study 1, the findings 6om Study 2 suggest that individuals 
with compartmentalized self-concept structures may be especially sensitive to social 
events. This sensitivity to social events may be due to the importance of social bonds 
regardless of the specific content of the self-concept.
The hypothesized association between compartmentahzation and contingent self­
esteem emerged primarily for individuals who placed more importance on their positive 
self-aspects than their negative self-aspects. This indicates that individuals with 
positively compartmentalized self-concept structures appear to possess self-esteem that is
49
contingent upon meeting certain standards. Compartmentalized individuals appear to be 
primarily concerned with sources of social approval whether it is 6om other people in 
general, family members, or even a religious deity. This focus on being accepted by 
others may be an attempt to sustain their rather tenuous positive attitudes toward the self. 
Thus, compartmentalized individuals may be more concerned than integrative individuals 
with monitoring their current levels of social acceptance and comparing themselves 
against external standards of achievement or success. This focus on environmental 
factors would appear to be closely related to the labile self-esteem of compartmentalized 
individuals. If compartmentalized individuals feel accepted, then they tend to feel very 
good about themselves. However, if they do not feel accepted or fail to reach a self- 
imposed standard, then their self-esteem is likely to plummet. This consistency in results 
between contingent self-esteem and labile self-esteem is not surprising given the 
conceptual similarities between these constructs.
STUDY]
The results of Study 2 indicate that the self-esteem of compartmentalized 
individuals may be more responsive to social events than is the self-esteem of integrative 
individuals. However, participants in Study 2 merely reported the events they 
experienced in the course of their daily lives. This leaves open the possibility of 
alternative explanations such as the daily social experiences of compartmentalized and 
integrative individuals differing in some systematic fashion. For example, it is possible 
that compartmentalized individuals may tend to focus more of their attention on short­
term relationships than integrative individuals. The inherent instability associated with 
short-term relationships may contribute to the stronger reactions to social events reported 
by compartmentalized individuals. If any sort of systematic difference exists in the daily 
events that compartmentalized and integrative individuals experience, this difference 
could mediate the relationship between self-concept structure and self-esteem lability.
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Thus, it is desirable to establish a direct, causal relationship between the event 
experienced by the individual and the individual's response to that particular event. This 
can be accomplished by observing the reactions of compartmentalized and integrative 
individuals to a lab manipulation in which the individual's experience of social 
acceptance or social rejection is controlled by the researcher.
Hypothesis 6: Individuals with compartmentalized self-concepts will experience 
lower state self-esteem than individuals with integrative self-concepts following a 
laboratory manipulation of social rejection.
Overview of Study 3 
In order to examine the association between self concept structure and responses 
to social rejection, participants were exposed to a laboratory manipulation in which 
feelings of social rejection or social acceptance were induced. Following the laboratory 
manipulation, participants were asked to report their state self-esteem, affect, and 
perceived social rejection on three occasions.
Method
farriopoMü
Participants were the same 138 undergraduates who participated in Study 2.
These participants completed the first laboratory session (i.e.. Study 2) and were 
scheduled to return to the laboratory one week later for the second laboratory session 
(i.e.. Study 3). Participants were told that the two laboratory sessions were being 
conducted for the same study.
Because the same participants were involved in Studies 2 and 3, the selfconcept 
content and structure, trait selfesteem, positive affect, and negative affect measures that 
were collected in Study 2 were used in the analyses for Study 3. In addition, participants 
also reported their level of perceived social rejection in Study 3.
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Perce! ^ociaZ Pe/ecfzo/!
Participants indicated their current level of perceived social rejection by 
indicating their level of agreement with the statement "At this moment, 1 feel rejected by 
others." Responses were made on scales ranging 6om 1 (a:troyig(y (füagree) to 10 
(a^ trong/y agree).
Procedure
To increase the impact of social rejection or acceptance, participants were asked 
to complete a questionnaire labeled "Personal Biography" before attending the laboratory 
session. The questionnaire requested the following information: (1) first name; (2) place 
of birth; (3) college major; (4) a list of hobbies; (5) the first four words diat come to mind 
when thinking about their lives; (6) the word that best describes them; (7) the first thing 
they would change about themselves; and (8) a brief description of how they imagine 
their lives in five years. Participants were also asked for their consent to share this 
information with three other participants with whom they believed they would interact 
during a mental visualization task.
At the beginning of the laboratory session, participants were given the "Personal 
Biography" questionnaires ostensibly belonging to their three teammates. They were 
given 5 minutes to read these questionnaires and to begin forming a mental image of their 
teammates. Participants were then instructed to visualize themselves, as well as the other 
players on their team, during an on-line game of virtual ball-toss. This cyberball task was 
developed by Williams and his colleagues (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000; Williams, 
Govan, Croker, Tynan, Cruickshank, & Lam, 2002) to induce feelings of social rejection 
and ostracism.
Each action taken by any member of the team was presented on the screen. When 
participants received the ball, they chose whom to throw the ball to by selecting that 
player's name. On each of the turns in which participants were not in possession of the
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ball, they watched what was occurring between the other players. The computer­
generated players' throws were controlled by an algorithm. The probability that they 
would throw it to the participant was programmed to correspond with the condition to 
which participants were randomly assigned. These conditions (social rejection vs. social 
acceptance) varied in the number of times participants were thrown the ball during the 30 
trials that constituted this task. In the social acceptance condition, participants received 
the ball during 25% of the trials, which is what would be expected by chance. In the 
social rejection condition, participants received the ball twice during the initial rounds 
and then did not receive it during the remainder of the task. The amount of time taken by 
the computer-generated players to make their decision and throw the ball was varied with 
each throw in an effort to increase the plausibility that these players were real 
participants.
Following the laboratory manipulation, feelings of social rejection and state 
psychological adjustment (e.g., self-esteem, positive affect, negative affect) were 
measured. In an effort to capture the effects of social rejection or acceptance on 
psychological adjustment over time, ac^ustment was measured at three points in time: 
immediately following the manipulation (Time 1), approximately 60 minutes after the 
manipulation (Time 2), and at approximately 10pm that evening (Time 3). Because 
participants completed the laboratory session at different times during the day, the 
number of hours separating the laboratory manipulation and the Time 3 measures varied 
between participants. It is also important to note that participants were debriefed 
concerning the purpose of the study immediately following the Time 2 measures. Thus, 
participants were aware of the purpose of the study -  and that their cyberball 
"teammates" did not actually exist -  when they completed the Time 3 measures.
Results
Of the 138 participants who completed all of the relevant measures for the present
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study, 75 were randomly assigned to the rejection condition and 63 were randomly 
assigned to the acceptance condition. Of these 138 participants, 123 participants 
completed the measures at Time 3.
fsycAo/ogicof foZZowmg f(e/echoM or v4ccepmnce
These analyses examine the association between evaluative organization and 
responses to social rejection or acceptance under controlled conditions iu the laboratory. 
As a manipulation check, differences in perceived social rejection and psychological 
adjustment between the social rejection and social acceptance conditions were examined 
for Time 1 (immediately following rejection). As expected, participants in the social 
rejection condition reported greater feelings of rejection than participants in the social 
acceptance condition immediately following the manipulation, i'(134.88) = -2.35,p  <
.02. This indicates that the social rqection manipulation successfully induced feelings of 
rejection. Unexpectedly, measures of state self-esteem and affect at Time 1 did not differ 
between conditions, |t's| < .74, /w. Although the failure to find differences in state 
psychological adjustment between the social rejection and acceptance conditions is 
surprising, it does not preclude interactions of self-concept structure and social rejection 
condition from emerging in subsequent analyses.
The relationships between self-concept structure and reactions to the social 
rejection manipulation were examined by a series of hierarchical multiple regressions.
For measures of psychological adjustment (i.e., self-esteem, positive affect, and negative 
affect), a main effect term for the trait-level of the criterion variable was included on Step 
1 to control for trait-level differences. For example, it was expected that individuals with 
high trait self-esteem would report relatively high state self-esteem following the social 
rejection manipulation. On Step 1, trait psychological adjustment, evaluative 
organization, differential importance, proportion of negative attributes, and social 
rejection condition (coded as 0 = and 1 = re/gctioM) were entered. On Step 2,
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the two-way interactions of the main effect terms were entered." Analyses concerning 
perceived social rejection did not include trait-level perceived social rejection because 
this construct was not measured. These analyses were conducted at each of the 
assessment points following the social rejection manipulation (i.e., Times 1,2, and 3).
The first set of analyses examined the hypothesis that compartmentalized 
individuals would report lower levels of state psychological adjustment immediately 
following social rejection. As expected, significant main effects of trait adjustment were 
found for each of the state measures of psychological adjustment, |3s > .53, ^ s < .001. 
These results indicate that individuals with high trait-levels of psychological ac^ustment 
continue to report relatively high levels of state psychological ac^ustment following the 
manipulation. Significant main effects of evaluative organization emerged for self­
esteem and positive affect, |Ps| > -.14, ps < .05. As predicted, a significant interaction of 
evaluative organization and social rejection condition emerged for self-esteem, p = -.15, 
p  < .04. Predicted values for this interaction are presented in Figure 9. Simple slopes tests 
revealed that for participants in the acceptance condition, evaluative organization was not 
a significant predictor of state self-esteem immediately following the manipulation P = 
.03, fK. However, participants with compartmentalized self-concept structures in the 
rejection condition reported lower self-esteem following the manipulation than 
participants with integrative self-concepts, P = -.28,/)< .02. Together, these results 
suggest that the state self-esteem of compartmentalized individuals may be more affected 
by social rejection than the state self-esteem of integrative individuals. No other 
significant effects involving social rejection condition emerged &om these analyses.
A similar analysis examined perceived social rejection at Time 1. For this 
analysis, main effects emerged for differential importance (P = -.18, p  < .05), proportion 
of negative attributes (P = .22, p < .02), and social rejection condition (P = .24, p  < .01).
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An interaction of evaluative organization and social rejection condition also emerged for 
perceived social rejection immediately following the manipulation, P = -.16, p  < .04. 
Predicted values for this interaction are shown in Figure 10. Simple slopes tests revealed 
that participants with integrative self-concepts did not differ in their feelings of rejection 
following the manipulation, p = .08, However, compartmentalized individuals in the 
rejection condition reported much higher levels of rejection than compartmentalized 
individuals in the acceptance condition, P = .43,p  < .001. No other signiGcant effects 
emerged for perceived rejection at Time 1.
TY/ne 2. One Ffbur .S'oczu/ or
The relation between self-concept structure and state psychological ac^ustment at 
Time 2 was examined to determine whether eSects that emerged immediately following 
the manipulation would persist and whether new effects would emerge over time. No 
interactions involving social rejection condition emerged for state self-esteem, affect, or 
perceived social rqection at Time 2.
ZzzMg j. fnzY i/ze Dary Fo/Zowzng 6'oczoZ /(^ecizo/z or
Similar analyses were conducted to examine whether the social rejection 
manipulation would have an effect on psychological adjustment hours later. As expected, 
signiGcant main effects of trait a<^ustment were fbimd for each of the state measures of 
psychological adjustment, Ps > .36, ps < .001. As with the Time 1 analysis of state self­
esteem, there was a signiGcant main effect of evaluaGve organizaGon, P = -.20, p  < .03, 
that was qualiGed by the interacGon of evaluaGve organizaGon and social rejecGon 
condiGon, p = -.20, p  < .04. The predicted values were similar to those presented in 
Figure 9. As with the Time 1 analyses, simple slopes tests revealed that for parGcipants in 
the acceptance condiGon, evaluaGve organizaGon was not related to state selfesteem at 
Time 3, P = .06, /w. However, compartmentalized individuals in the rejecGon condiGon 
reported lower self-esteem following the manipulaGon than parGcipants with integraGve
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self-concepts, |3 = -.34, p  < .02.
A similar analysis was conducted for the single-item measure of perceived social 
rejection at Time 3. An interaction of evaluative organization and social rejection 
condition also emerged from this analysis, P = -.21, < .05. The predicted values for this 
analysis are similar to those presented in Figure 10. As with the Time 1 analyses, simple 
slopes tests revealed that participants with integrative self-concepts did not differ in level 
of perceived rejection regardless of condition, p = -.13, w. However, compartmentalized 
individuals in the rejection condition reported much higher levels of perceived rejection 
than compartmentalized individuals in the acceptance condition, p = .29,/? < .05.
Discussion
The sensitivity of compartmentalized individuals to social rejection was 
demonstrated by their lower levels of state self-esteem and higher levels of perceived 
rejection following the laboratory manipulation. However, the duration of their reactions 
to the social rejection manipulation remains unclear. Low state self-esteem and high 
levels of perceived rejection were evident for compartmentalized individuals 
immediately following the manipulation (Time 1) but these effects did not emerge one 
hour later (Time 2). These findings seem to indicate that the responsiveness of 
compartmentalized individuals is somewhat short-lived (i.e., less than one hour). 
However, the low state self-esteem and high levels of perceived rejection reemerged for 
compartmentalized individuals at the end of the day (Time 3). It is possible that 
participants used the measures completed between Time 1 and Time 2 to activate their 
positive aspects or that these measures may have inadvertently served as a distraction 
task. This is consistent with previous findings showing that compartmentalized 
individuals are able to recover from a sad mood induction relatively quickly when they 
were allowed to distract themselves (Showers & Kling, 1996). It is also possible that the 
lack of effects at Time 2 may be due to the laboratory manipulation rather than being
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indicative of how quickly compartmentalized individuals can recover from negative 
experiences. For example, laboratory manipulations of the sort employed in the present 
study produce relatively weak effects that are typically short-lived (Blaney, 1986; 
Buchwald, Strack, & Coyne, 1981; Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983). The re-emergence of 
effects at Time 3 could be due to an unexplored ruminative tendency among 
compartmentalized individuals or be the result of participants lacking a convenient 
method to distract or affirm themselves at the end of the day.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present studies examined whether compartmentalized individuals possess 
self-esteem that is relatively fragile. The results of three studies suggest that the self­
esteem of compartmentalized individuals may be characterized as unstable over time, 
labile in response to daily events, and contingent upon meeting certain standards. Studies 
I and 2 found that individuals with compartmentalized self-concept structures possess 
less stable selfesteem than individuals with integrative self-concepts; however, this 
effect may be more pronounced among individuals who possess high levels of trait self 
esteem. The unstable self-esteem that characterizes individuals with compartmentalized 
self-concepts appears to be an example of the hidden vulnerability of 
compartmentahzation. This instability may be due to compartmentalized individuals 
being vulnerable to shifts in the salience of particular self aspects.
If compartmentalized individuals are vulnerable to shifts in the salience of 
particular self aspects, then it would be expected that the state self-esteem of 
compartmentalized individuals would have a stronger relationship with daily events than 
the state self-esteem of integrative individuals. As hypothesized. Studies 1 and 2 found 
that individuals with compartmentalized self-concept structures possessed state self 
esteem that was more labile than the state self-esteem of individuals with integrative self 
concepts. This increased reactivity was shown for both daily events and perceived stress.
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However, this reactivity was found only in response to daily hassles and did not emerge 
for daily uplifts in Study 1. One possible explanation for this result is that the measure of 
daily uplifts was not particularly sensitive to the types of positive events that are relevant 
to college students. This explanation is supported by the results 6om Study 2 which 
found the state self-esteem of compartmentalized individuals to be more reactive to both 
positive and negative daily events. The measure of daily events used in Study 2 was 
specifically designed to be relevant to the daily experiences of college students (Butler, 
Hokanson, & Flynn, 1994). In Study 2, the effects of daily events were found to be 
determined primarily by social events rather than events related to achievement. These 
results are not surprising given the important link between self-esteem and social 
rejection (e.g., Leary, Haupt, Strausser, & Chokel, 1998; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & 
Downs, 1995). Although the analyses pertaining to daily events in Studies 1 and 2 
employed group-mean centering, similar results emerged when daily event scores were 
not centered. This suggests that both the relative number of events (i.e., group-mean 
centered event scores) as well as the absolute number of events (i.e., uncentered event 
scores) may have important implications for state self-esteem. In Study 3, similar self­
esteem lability results were found for individuals with compartmentalized self-concepts 
following a laboratory manipulation in which feelings of either social acceptance or 
social rejection were elicited. Across the present studies, the lability of individuals with 
compartmentalized self-concept structures was limited almost exclusively to kelings of 
self-worth. This is consistent with the contention that the consequences of evaluative 
organization are due to the accessibility of self-knowledge rather than reflecting a more 
direct path to mood (Showers, 1995). However, it is also possible that the relative lack of 
findings concerning affect may have been due to the measure of affect employed in the 
present studies not being speciGc to self-relevant affect (e.g., shame).
Although self-esteem instability has received the most empirical attention of the
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models of 6agile self-esteem, it is not the only means for distinguishing secure and 
fragile self-esteem. Other models of ûagile selfesteem include: defensive selfesteem 
(Homey, 1950; Schneider & Turkat, 1975), discrepant implicit and explicit selfesteem 
(Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003; Brown & Bosson, 2001; Jordan, Spencer, 
Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003), and contingent self-esteem (Crocker & 
Wolfe, 2001; Deci & Ryan, 1995). In an effort to examine whether the self-esteem of 
compartmentalized individuals would be characterized by models of &agile self-esteem 
other than self-esteem instability, contingent self-esteem was included in Study 2. The 
hypothesized relationship between evaluative organization and contingent self-esteem 
emerged primarily for those individuals with positive self-concepts. More specifically, 
individuals with positively compartmentalized self-concept structures reported the 
highest levels of contingent self-esteem. This focus on meeting certain standards may be 
an attempt by compartmentalized individuals to sustain their rather tenuous positive 
attitudes toward the self. For compartmentalized individuals, this focus on environmental 
factors would appear to be closely related to their labile self-esteem. Thus, 
compartmentalized individuals may feel very good about themselves when they are able 
to manage their lives so that they are usually successful in meeting these standards; 
however, these individuals may be unable to maintain these extemaUy-based feelings of 
self-worth on those occasions when they fail to meet relevant standards.
Why Is Compartmentahzation Associated With Fragile Self-Esteem?
The explanation for the relationship between evaluative organization and &agile 
self-esteem has focused on the shifting salience of particular se lf aspects. This 
explanation has considerable appeal given that compartmentahzation may serve as a 
means to isolate negative attributes and beliefs. In support of this view, recent studies of 
structural change in response to stress have found that individuals are reliant on 
compartmentahzation to a greater extent than predicted by the basic model of evaluative
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organization (Showers, Abramson, & Hogan, 1998; Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2003). 
Conceptually, important similarities exist between compartmentahzation and the 
psychodynamic concept of splitting (Fairbaim, 1952; Kemberg, 1984) in which positive 
or negative aspects of the self or intimate others are kept separate (Showers & Kevlyn, 
1999). For example, both splitting and compartmentahzation provide ways for 
individuals to deal with negative behefs by limiting access to that information. Splitting 
accomphshes this goal through the use of repression, whereas compartmentahzation 
achieves the same goal through the isolation of negative information by relegating those 
behefs to self-aspects that are unimportant and are rarely activated. However, both 
sphtting and compartmentahzation leave individuals vulnerable to the re-emergence of 
these negative behefs when repression or isolation fails (Showers & Kling, 1996). Future 
research should examine the similarities between sphtting and compartmentahzation as 
well as further exploring the conditions under which compartmentalized individuals may 
be overwhelmed by negative behefs.
The shifting sahence of particular self-aspects is not the only potential 
explanation for the link between hagile self-esteem and compartmentahzation. Another 
possibility is that compartmentalized individuals may possess self-knowledge that is 
inconsistent. Individuals with inconsistent self-knowledge -  such as individuals with low 
self-concept clarity or highly differentiated self-concepts -  are beheved to possess hagile 
self-esteem because their impoverished self-concept forces them to be more reliant on 
their immediate contexts for cues concerning their feelings of self-worth (Don, 2002; 
Kemis, Paradise, et al., 2000). Functionally similar inconsistencies may exist within 
compartmentalized structures. Because evaluative organization is concerned with the 
valence of specific self-beliefs, a compartmentalized self-concept is likely to be 
evaluatively inconsistent across self-aspects by its very definition. That is, because of the 
segregation of positive and negative attributes, individuals with compartmentalized self-
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concept structures may have greater variability in evaluations between self-aspects than 
individuals with integrative self-concepts. Individuals with integrative self-concept 
structures, on the other hand, may have inconsistencies within a particular self-aspect.
For example, an integrative individual may consider oneself to be .yAy but genwme during 
social interactions. Because these self-beliefs are contained within the same self-aspect, 
this may suggest that the integrative individual has been successful in resolving the 
evaluative inconsistency between these specific self-beliefs. Not surprisingly, data &om 
the present studies confirm that compartmentahzation is significantly associated with the 
variabihty in evaluations across self-aspects, rs > .53, j?s < .001. This evaluative 
inconsistency of compartmentalized structures offers a potential explanation for the 
&agile self-esteem of compartmentalized individuals that complements the explanation 
concerning the shifting sahence of specific self-aspects.
It should be noted that the explanations presented for the current findings are 
based on a process model which assumes that evaluative organization is a relatively 
stable feature of the individual that exists prior to potentially self-relevant events and 
influences self-esteem and affective reactions to these events. However, the data in the 
present studies cannot rule out the possibility that the direction of causality is reversed. 
For example, Larsen & Diener (1987) provided an alternative conceptuahzation of 
structural effects which suggests that the tendency to experience extreme and variable 
emotional states may actually determine the structure of the self-concept rather than 
structure determining emotional responses. This model implies that individuals with 
stronger affective reactions may structure their self-representations in a manner that tends 
to generate the higher levels of affect they desire. For example, an individual who desires 
intense emotions may construct a simple life organized around only a fsw self-aspects 
such as being a mother and wife. By organizing her life in this manner, her emotional 
states are likely to be very dependent upon her relationships with her children and her
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husband. When she feels loved and accepted by her family, she may experience 
extremely positive emotions; however, she may experience extremely negative emotions 
on those occasions when she does not feel loved and accepted by her family. If 
necessary, it seems that she could reduce the intensity and variability of her emotional 
experiences by increasing the complexity of her life (e.g., by focusing some of her 
attention on her role as a worker). Of course, it is also possible that emotional reactivity 
and self-concept structure are both by-products of some third variable (Emmons & King, 
1989). For example, certain neurologically-based memory deficiencies may lead 
individuals to act as though their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are completely 
dependent upon what is happening in the present (Lumsden, 1993). It is possible that 
both compartmentahzation and ûagile self-esteem are due to this sort of time &ame 
truncation. Future research should examine whether this sort of memory bias is 
associated with compartmentahzation.
Previous studies have established that positively compartmentalized individuals 
tend to possess the high levels of self-esteem and positive mood (e.g., Showers, 1992a; 
Showers, Abramson, & Hogan, 1998). However, these studies have rehed exclusively on 
self-report measures of current adjustment which leaves open the possibility that 
positively compartmentalized individuals may positively inflate their self-reports of 
ac^ustment. Essentially, compartmentahzation may reflect a tendency to bolster self­
esteem and mood by denying or isolating information that threatens feelings of self- 
worth or mood. This tendency may be manifested in responses to self-report measures of 
psychological adjustment. Thus, some of the benefits that are beheved to be associated 
with compartmentahzation -  such as high self-esteem -  may not actually reflect true 
psychological ac^ustment. This perspective is supported by results from the present 
studies showing that individuals with compartmentalized self-concept structures may 
possess hagile self-esteem.
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Conclusion
The present studies explored the possibility that evaluative organization is 
associated with fragile self-esteem. Across three studies, compartmentalized individuals 
were found to possess self-esteem that was less stable over time, more reactive to daily 
events, and more contingent on meeting certain standards than the self-esteem of 
integrative individuals. The present findings are consistent with the view that 
compartmentahzation may leave individuals vulnerable to shifts in the salience of 
particular self-aspects which may have serious implications for long-term psychological 
adjustment. Thus, compartmentalized individuals may experience relatively high self­
esteem on days when things go well for them but their self-esteem may plummet on days 
when things go poorly. Individuals with integrative self-concept structures, on the other 
hand, possess feelings of self-worth that are less affected by daily experiences because of 
their continued access to both positive and negative information about the self.
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Footnotes
' Compartmentalized and integrative selF-concept structures are referred to for 
ease of explanation. Conceptually and empirically, evaluative organization is a 
continuous variable with compartmentalization and integration representing the ends of 
the continuum.
 ^In previous research, self-esteem instability has often been measured by 
assessing state self-esteem at 12 hour intervals over 4 days (e.g., Monday night to Friday 
morning; Kemis, Paradise, Whitaker, Wheatman, & Gol&nan, 2000; Kemis,
Whisenhunt, WaschuU, Greenier, Berry, Herlocker et al., 1998; Paradise & Kemis,
2002). Data were collected over 14 days in the current study in order to examine the 
within-person relationships between state self-esteem and daily stress. Within the current 
sample, measures of self-esteem instability for these two periods (14 days vs. 4 days) 
were h i ^ y  correlated, r  = .83.
Unfortunately, the date and time participants provided their responses were not 
recorded or verified (cf Reis & Gable, 2000; Tennen & Affleck, 2002). Two potential 
ways to rectify this problem are through the use of computer-assisted daily reporting 
methods that document the exact time participants complete daily measures (Stone, 
Shiffman, & DeVries, 1999) or by having participants retum the measures to the 
researcher each day. This is important considering large numbers of participants delay 
completing one or more daily measures during their participation (Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 
2000; Litt, Cooney, & Morse, 1998). As Tennen and Affleck (2002) point out, this 
increase in retrospective accounts will, at best, lead to increased error variance. However, 
this optimistic view assumes that the delays in completion of daily measures are random 
both across participants and within participants over time. More likely, given the 
literature concerning systematic biases in recalled experiences (e.g., Conway & Ross, 
1986; Pearson, Ross, & Dawes, 1992), individuals who delay responses to daily measures 
may rely on their own implicit theories concerning personality and the stability of 
personality. Despite this limitation, participants did appear to comply with instructions. 
First, they were given reminders at both the first and second lab sessions to drop the 
measures off approximately every 3 days. Second, their supply of daily measures would 
only last until the next lab session (i.e., one week later). Third, as instructed, some 
participants skipped days when they forgot to complete the daily measures.
 ^To replicate previous findings concerning the association between self-concept 
structure and negative mood (e.g.. Showers, 1992a), the BDI-II was regressed onto 
evaluative organization, differential importance, and proportion of negatives. Similar to 
findings from previous studies, a significant interaction of evaluative organization and 
differential importance was obtained for level of negative mood, P = -.18, p < .05. Simple 
slopes tests found that when self-concept structure was compartmentalized, high 
differential importance was associated with lower negative mood than low differential 
importance, |3 = -.41,/? < .01. When self-concept structure was integrative, there was no 
difference between high differential importance and low differential importance, P = - 
.07, MS. As predicted by the basic model of evaluative organization, compartmentalized 
individuals reported extreme levels of negative mood.
 ^Initial analyses included differential importance, proportion of negative 
attributes, and their interactions. Because none of these terms approached conventional 
levels of significance, |Ps| < .13, ns, they were trimmed &om the final analyses (cf. Hull, 
Tedlie, & Lehn, 1992; Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, in press). However, when the main 
effects of differential importance and proportion of negative attributes were entered on 
Step 1, the interaction of evaluative organization and self-esteem level only approached 
significance, p = .18,/? < .06.
 ^To increase the ease of interpretation, this analysis used the untransformed daily
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hassles and uplifts scores. Similar results were obtained with the square-root transformed 
scores, daily hassles = 2.72 and daily uplifts = 3.20, t(108) = -4.44, p < .001.
 ^The results of the analyses were consistent when proportion of negative 
attributes and differential impoidance were included in the model. The moderating effect 
of evaluative organization for the relationship between state self-esteem and daily hassles 
approached statistical significance, B = -.85, p  < .06.
 ^The results of &e analyses were similar when proportion of negative attributes 
and differential importance were included in the model. Evaluative organization 
significantly moderated the relationship between state self-esteem and stress, B = -.37, p 
< . 01.
 ^Initial analyses included differential importance, proportion of negative 
attributes, and their interactions. Because none of these terms approached conventional 
levels of si^Gcance, |Ps| < .17, /w, they were trimmed Gom the final analyses.
Initial analyses included the three-way interaction of the main effect terms. 
Because the three-way interaction did not approach conventional levels of signiGcance 
for the global measure of contingent self-esteem or any of the seven domains, |Ps| < .15, 
7K, they were trimmed Gom the Gnal analyses.
" IniGal analyses included the three-way interacGons of the main effect terms. 
Because the three-way interacGon did not approach convenGonal levels of signiGcance 
for any of the analyses, they were trimmed Gom the Gnal analyses for Times 1,2, and 3.
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Table 1
Examp/gf Carc/ TZ/ity r^o/mg ComparfTMgyz/a/izaffon OM(/ /nfegraffon
-~j
OO
Panel A: Compartmentalized Organization
Me at home Me at work Me in class
Me in
Norman, OK
Me and my 
sorority
Me with people 
I don't know
Me when 
I'm stressed
Giving Successful Successful Successful Successful -  Weary -  Hopeless
Confident Capable Capable Confident Giving -  Inferior -  Not the “real me”
Comfortable Confident Independent Comfortable Confident -  Tense -  Uncomfortable
Lovable Comfortable Organized Independent Comfortable -  Sad & Blue
Outgoing Needed Interested Fun & Lovable -  Irritable
Happy Communicative Hardworking Entertaining Fun & -  Disorganized
Friendly Organized Interested Entertaining -  Tense
Optimistic Interested Outgoing Interested
Outgoing Hardworking Outgoing
Hardworking Happy Energetic
Happy Friendly Happy
Friendly Optimistic Friendly
Panel B: Integrative Organization
African Intimate Dreams
Family Religion Student A m erican R elationship Friendship (as in goals) Perfectionist
Organized Needed Successful -  Hopeless Comfortable Giving Independent Successful
-  Irritable Organized -  Lazy Organized -  Irritable -  Uncomfortable Organized -  Disagreeing
-  Disagreeing Giving Mature Confident -  Immature -  Insecure Weary -  Irritable
— Self-centered Happy -  Irritable -  Irritable -  Insecure -  Irritable Capable
Communicative -  Irritable Organized -  Inferior -  Isolated Confident
Lovable Optimistic Intelligent Organized Organized Organized
Fun & Interested -  Tense Friendly Intelligent
Entertaining Hardworking -  Not the “real me" Outgoing
Energetic -  Tense Hardworking 
-  Tense
Note. Negative attributes are identified by a minus sign. Panel A: compartmentalization = 1.00; differential importance = .80; and proportion of negative 
attributes = . 17. Panel B: compartmentalization = j2 ;  differential importance = .65; and proportion o f negative attributes = .40.
Table 2
Awafy 7. 7M7ercorrg/a/;oMf OM(7D&ycr^/fve A a f ü / f c ; / b r  M ea^w re ; Arwcfwre. iS'e(7-Co/:cepf Confe/zA aM<7 TrazV
AycAo/ogzco/
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Evaluative Organization (121)
2. Differential Importance .14 (121)
3. Proportion of Negative Attributes .31"' -.24" (121)
4. Trait Self-Esteem -.16^ .27" -.35'" (121)
5. Positive Affect -.04 .35"' -.33'" .68'" (121)
6. Negative Affect .10 -.29'" .36'" -.55'" -.48'" (121)
7. Negative Mood (BDI-II) .08 -.25" .27" -.50'" -.49'" .61'" (121)
8. Self-Esteem Instability .18^ -.04 .17^ -.22' .10 .14 .32'" (109)
M 0.71 0.47 0.28 42.51 37.52 22.00 3.36 6.46
SD 0.24 0.45 0.15 7.26 6.43 7.59 1.32 4.51
A/bfe: Values in parentheses are the number of respondents who completed each measure. Proportion of negative attributes was arcsine 
transformed and depressive symptoms was square-root transformed for the computation of correlations. Means and standard 
deviations shown are transformed values. Actual values: proportion of negative attributes, M = .28, = .15; negative mood, Af =
12.51, JD = 9.43.
.10; p  < .05; **p< .01; "*p< .001.
Table 3
y." //zerarcAfcaZ q/'^'e^Effee/M T/wfaAf/zfy 0»fo Eva/waAve
OrgüMtzaAoM an(f TroA 5'g//^ E^ yfeem
Predictors
Self-Esteem Instability
Cumulative Increase in
Step 1: .04 .04
Evaluative Organization .03^ .16^
Trait Self-Esteem .01 -.11
Step 2: .08* .04*
Phi X Trait Self-Esteem .03* .19*
M)fg. (squared semipartial correlation coefficient) represents the proportion of 
variance uniquely accounted for by each predictor, beyond that accounted for by all other 
predictors at Aat step. The sign of (semipartial correlation coefficient) indicates the 
direction of the relation between each predictor and the criterion variable. Phi = 
evaluative organization.
^  < .10; 'p < .05.
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Table 4
7/ /ô r fjycAo/ogicaZ y4(ÿz^ AMe»f am7 Dai/y Eve/zü
Daily Measures
Mean
Within-Person
5D
Between-Person
&0 Rehability
State Self-Esteem 81.58 7.75 13.27 .97
State Positive Affect 24.59 6.89 5.65 .90
State Negative Affect 17.09 5.33 4.67 .91
Daily Hassles 2.57 .83 1.08 .96
Daily Uplifts 3.48 .65 1.03 .97
Stress 5.18 2.14 2.22 .93
TVbfe: A^= 109. Daily hassles and daily uplifts were square-root transformed. Means and 
standard deviations shown are transformed values. Actual values: daily hassles, M = 
8.43, within-person &D = 4.31, between-person &0 = 5.84; daily uplifts, M = 11.63, 
within-person &D = 4.93, between-person 5D = 7.79.
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Table 5
/. jHLAf freal/c/mg Aafe fjycAo/ogzca/ X^ÿu^/me»/_/rom Do;/y ÆveMf^
State Self-Esteem State Positive Affect State Negative Affect
Coeff.' f SE"
Effect
size"^ Coeff.' t SE^
Effect
size"^ Coeff.' i
Effect 
SE" size"
Intercept 81.58 55.89'" 1.28 24.58 43.22'" .57 17.09 36.58'" .47
Daily Hassles -1.83 -4.39'" .50 .39 -.41 -1.31 .32 1.84 6.95'" .26 .56
Daily Uplifts 1.06 2.11' .42 .20 2.83 6.72'" .42 .54 -1.28 -4.35'" .30 .39
Intercept 81.58 55.89'" 1.28 24.58 43.22'" .57 17.09 36.58'" .47
Stress -.80 -5.56'" .14 .47 -.51 -4.11'" .13 .37 1.00 10.40'" .10 .71
OQ M)fg: ^  = 109, (ÿ"= 108.
a. Unstandardized coefBcients.
b. Standard error.
c. Eûect sizes were conmuted with the following formula (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984) and are presented for significant effects only: 
r = square root of [f^ /(r + «ÿ)].
< .05; "p  < .01; '" p  < .001
Table 6
y. Eva/uoffvg a; a MWerafor q/^  FKi/AfVz-feryom /(e/affOfwAÿ)a ^eAvee/z Dof/y OMc/ Aofe faycAo/ogica/
Daily Self-Esteem Daily Positive Affect Daily Negative Affect
Coeff.' ^ SE"
Effect
size" Coeff." t
Effect 
SE" size" Coeff.' t
Effect 
SE" size"
Intercept -2.76 -2.47' 1.12 .63 1.14 .55 .39 1.02 .38
Daily Hassles -.74 -1.98' .38 .19 -.09 -.28 .32 .37 1.58 .23
Daily Uplifts .54 1.07 .50 .39 .85 .45 -.43 -1.21 .35
Intercept -2.76 -2.47' 1.12 .63 1.14 .55 .39 1.02 .38
Stress -.39 -3.25" .12 .30 -.20 -1.87^ .11 .04 .48 .09
OO
^  A/bfe: N = 109, fÿ" = 107.
a. Unstandardized coefficients.
b. Standard error.
c. Effect sizes were conmuted with the following formula (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984) and are presented for significant effects only: 
r  = square root of [r^  / ( r  + (ÿ)].
^ p < .1 0 / ;X .0 5 /p < .0 1 .
OO
Table 7
2; /Mferco/TeWzoMJ owf D&ycnpAve AaAf Ac;/br Mig&yurg; q/^5"g(/^CoMC f^ Arwcfwre, j"e^CoMcepf CoM/ewf, TraA 
f;ycAo/ogfca/ wzA Co/zAmge/iCfe; o/^^b^fFbrfA
Variable I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. Evaluative Organization (138)
2. Differential Importance .09 (138)
3. Proportion of Negative Attributes .45"' -.10 (138)
4. Trait Self-Esteem -.13 .37'" -.45'" (138)
5. Trait Positive Affect -.13 .28'" -.44'" .56'" (138)
6. Trait Negative Affect .07 -.20' .40'" -.46'" -.19' (138)
7. Others' Approval .24" -.16^ .23" -.24'" -.24" .14 (138)
8. Physical Appearance .19' -.12 .27" -.34'" -.12 .40'" .42'" (138)
9. Outdoing Others in Competition .03 .09 .11 -.07 .01 .20' .15^ .34'" (138)
10. Academic Competence .07 -.07 .10 -.08 .04 .21' .36'" .37'" .37"' (138)
11. Family Love and Support .05 .02 -.09 .10 .14^ .05 .26" .26" .06 .29'" (138)
12. Being Virtuous and Moral .18' .02 -.04 .10 .07 -.04 .35'" .16^ .02 .45'"' .37'" (138)
13. God's Love .09 .12 -.16^ .20' .20' -.04 .22" .12 -.07 .21' .46'" .41" ' (138)
14. Self-Esteem Instability .29'" .03 .28" -.32'" -.17^ .27" -.08 .13 .04 .06 -.04 -.03 -.17^ (118)
M .68 .44 .28 42.24 :36.67 21.67 20.03 24.51 24.97 27.80 27.00 25.88 24.50 4.97
5D .24 .47 .15 5.93 5.81 7.07 6.28 4.98 5.80 4.97 5.44 5.92 9.62 3.78
M)/e: Values in parentheses are the number of respondents who completed each measure. Proportion of negative attributes was arcsine 
transformed for the computation of correlations. Mean and standard deviation shown are transformed values. Actual values: 
proportion of negative attributes, M = .28,57) = .15.
^  < .10; < .05; < .01; < .001
Table 8
S'fWy 2; Descriptive Aatistics yôr &ate fs^^cAcZogicaZ Xiÿwst/»CMt a/i(  ^Dgi/y Dvents
Daily Measures
Mean
Within-Person
5D
Between-Person
5D Reliability
State Self-Esteem 80.06 6.03 11.61 .96
State Positive Affect 28.98 6.56 7.45 .90
State Negative Affect 19.61 5.48 7.09 .92
Positive Events 6.94 2.06 2.92 .93
Negative Events 3.75 1.71 2.75 .95
Note: / /=  118.
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Table 9
AWy 2." q/^ÆLM f  re(/;cf!Mg .ÿ/afe f  jycAo/og/ca/ y4(ÿ!tÿ^ 7MeMf /rom D a;^ Evemü
Daily Self-Esteem Daily Positive Affect Daily Negative Affect
Coeff. t- SE"
Effect
size"^ Coeff." t
Effect 
SE'' size" Coeff.' t
Effect 
SE" size"
Intercept 80.04 73.25'" 1.09 28.98 40.25'" .72 19.61 28.97'" .68
Positive Events .46 4.72'" .10 .40 1.22 9.56'" .13 .66 -.63 -5.25'" .12 .44
Negative Events -.41 -3.06" .13 .27 -.65 -3.85'" .17 .33 1.23 7.63'" .16 .58
00o\
M)fe: # =  118, (ÿ"= 117.
a. Unstandardized coefficients.
b. Standard error.
c. Effect sizes were conmuted with the following formula (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984) and are presented for signiEcant effects only: 
r  = square root of [r^ /(r + (ÿ)].
p< .05 ; "p < .0 1 ;"p < .0 0 1 .
Table 10
2." OrgaMzzaf/oM a ; a Mb^/erafor q/^  fPi/AzM-fer^ gon /fe/abo/wA/pj  ^Befwee/z Daz(y EvenZ  ^anb Aafe Aj/cAo/ogzco/
y^ zÿzzfbMg»/
Daily Self-Esteem Daily Positive Affect Daily Negative Affect
Coeff.' t SE""
Effect
size" Coeff.' t
Effect 
SE" size" Coeff.' t
Effect 
SE" size"
Intercept -2.35 -2.33* 1.01 -1.12 - 1.57 .72 1.00 1.81^ .55
Positive Events .23 2.82** .08 .25 .18 1.30 .14 -.22 -1.88^ .11
Negative Events -.25 -1.99* .13 .18 .01 .06 .17 -.03 -.25 .12
OO
AA)fe:Ar=118,cy=116.
a. Unstandardized coefficients.
b. Standard error.
c. Effect sizes were conmuted with the following formula (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984) and are presented for signiAcant effects only: 
r = square root of [f^ /(r + zÿ)].
ip<.10; p< .05 ; "p< .01 .
Table 11
2. /(eyw/t; q/^ /A M  Xna/yfey fre^ic/mg &afe fjycAo/og/ca/ X^ÿw^f^enf/rom .S^ ocza/ aM(f v^ cAfeve/nem/ ÆvgM/f
State Self-Esteem State Positive Affect State Negative Affect
Coeff.' t SE*"
Effect
size‘s Coeff.' t SE"
Effect
size'^ Coeff.' t SE"
Effect
size''
Intercept 80.04 73.25'" 1.09 28.98 40.25'" .72 19.61 28.97'" .68
Positive Social .45 2.76" .16 .25 1.38 7.72'" .18 .58 -.84 -5.59'" .15 .46
Negative Social -.65 -3.75"' .17 .33 -.55 -2.20' .25 .20 1.31 6.52'" .20 .52
Positive Achievement .55 3.66'" .15 .32 .99 4.37'" .23 .38 -.25 -1.40 .18
Negative Achievement -.08 -.30 .28 -.88 -2.99" .29 .27 1.15 4.60'" .25 .39
OO
OO
A/bfe: N = 118, (ÿ"= 116.
a. Unstandardized coeSicients.
b. Standard error.
c. Effect sizes were conmuted with the following formula (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984) and are presented for significant effects only: 
r  = square root of fr^ /(r + (ÿ)l.
p < .0 5 ; 'p < .0 1 ;" p < .0 0 1 .
Table 12
5'fWy 2." O/gan/za/zoM a AfWerafor PKiVAfVz-fer^ o» /(e/affO/wA/p  ^Be^ee» 5"ocfa/ one/ ^ cAievemeMf Æve»ü an(/ Aafe
faycAo/ogico/ v4(ÿwf fmenf
State Self-Esteem State Positive Affect State Negative Affect
Coeff.' t
Effect 
SE" size' Coeff.' t SE"
Effect
size' Coeff.' t
Effect 
SE" size'
Intercept -2.35 -2.33' 1.01 -1.13 1.56 .72 1.00 1.81 .55
Positive Social .29 2.12' .14 .19 .42 2.43' .17 .22 -.27 2.16' .13 .20
Negative Social -.43 -2.43' .18 .22 -.31 1.24 .25 .21 .91 .23
Positive Achievement .20 1.27 .16 -.04 -.19 .24 -.09 -.53 .17
Negative Achievement -.07 -.27 .25 .42 1.47 .28 -.11 -.49 .22
OO\o
M )fe:^=118, (ÿ'=116.
a. Unstandardized coefïîcients.
b. Standard error.
c. Effect sizes were conmuted wi± the following formula (RosenAal & Rosnow, 1984) and are presented for significant effects only: 
r  = square root of / ( r  + ^ 1 .
p < .0 5 ;" p < .0 1 ;" p < .0 0 1 .
Table 13
AWy 2." q/^  Con/mgenf On^o Memure^ q/".9e^
CoMcepf CoM/g»r aM(/ .S^ frwcfwre
Contingent Self-Esteem
Predictors Cumulative Increase in
Step 1: .04 .04
Evaluative Organization .04' .19'
Differential Importance .00 -.02
Proportion of Negative Attributes .00 -.03
Step 2: .10' .06'
PhiXDI .06" .24"
Phi X Neg .00 .07
DI X Neg .01 -.10
M)fg. (squared semipartial correlation coefficient) represents the proportion of 
variance uniquely accounted for by each predictor, beyond that accounted for by all other 
predictors at that step. The sign of (semipartial correlation coefficient) indicates the 
direction of the relation between each predictor and the criterion variable. Phi = 
evaluative organization; DI = differential importance; Neg = proportion of negative 
attributes, 
p < .05; "p < .01.
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Figure 7. Study 1: Predicted values for self-esteem instability, illustrating the interaction 
of evaluative organization and trait self-esteem at values that are one standard deviation 
above and below the means.
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Figure 2. Study 1 : Adjusted predicted values for state self-esteem, illustrating the cross­
level interaction of evaluative organization (one standard deviation above and below the 
grand mean) and daily hassles (two standard errors above and below the group mean).
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Figure 5. Study 1: Adjusted predicted values for state self-esteem, illustrating the cross­
level interaction of evaluative organization (one standard deviation above and below the 
grand mean) and stress (two standard errors above and below the group mean).
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Ffgwre Study 2: Adjusted predicted values for state self-esteem, illustrating the cross­
level interaction of evaluative organization (one standard deviation above and below the 
grand mean) and daily positive events (two standard errors above and below the group 
mean).
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Ffg«rg J. Study 2: Ac^usted predicted values for state self-esteem, illustrating the cross­
level interaction of evaluative organization (one standard deviation above and below the 
grand mean) and daily negative events (two standard errors above and below the group 
mean).
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Fzgwrg 6. Study 2: Adjusted predicted values for state self-esteem, illustrating the cross­
level interaction of evaluative organization (one standard deviation above and below the 
grand mean) and daily positive social events (two standard errors above and below the 
group mean).
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Figwe 7. Study 2: Adjusted predicted values for state self-esteem, illustrating the cross­
level interaction of evaluative organization (one standard deviation above and below the 
grand mean) and daily negative social events (two standard errors above and below the 
group mean).
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Figwre &. Study 2: Adjusted predicted values for contingent self-esteem, illustrating the 
interaction of evaluative organization and differential importance at values that are one 
standard deviation above and below the means.
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Ffgwfg P. Study 3: Adjusted predicted values for state self-esteem at Time 1, illustrating 
the interaction of evaluative organization and social rejection condition at values that are 
one standard deviation above and below the means.
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Figwrg 70. Study 3: Adjusted predicted values for perceived rejection at Time 1, 
illustrating the interaction of evaluative organization and social rejection condition at 
values that are one standard deviation above and below the means.
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